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The common intrusion detection system is unable to determine the relevance
of the alerts it generates because it lacks network and context awareness. A
prototype was developed with the purpose of reducing the amount of false
positives found in these systems. The prototype has the ability to determine
the relevance of each alert by investigating the alert’s vulnerability informa-
tion and the target’s host information. Challenges with passive fingerprinting
of hosts behind Network Address Translation and in dynamic networks were
also discussed and solved. Testing on real network traffic indicated that the
prototypewas successful in correctly categorizing a variety of alerts by assign-
ing scores to each alert. This way the alerts can be ordered by their likeliness
of being true positives, and the number of alerts that the system administrator
has to investigate is reduced to a manageable size.
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According to projectionsmade by Cisco, Internet trafficwill continue to rapidly
increase over the next few years, estimating a growth by a factor of four in the
period from 2010 to 2015 [1]. Furthermore Cisco predicts there will be twice as
many networked devices as there are people on the planet by 2015, in contrast
to one device per person in 2010 [1]. These developments are important points
to be aware of in regards to IntrusionDetection Systems (IDS) and fightingma-
licious traffic on the Internet, because it gives us some idea of what challenges
we will be facing. From an intrusion detection point of view increased Inter-
net traffic means we will have to analyze a larger amount of data. In all likeli-
hoodwewill also see an increased number of new services surfacing which are
also suspicable to malicious usage. The most obvious ways to deal with these
problems would perhaps be with higher performance hardware and software,
while other approaches would be concerned with changing how the malicious
traffic is identified or logs are analyzed.
In a threat report from 2010, the network security company Symantec revealed
some disturbing trends, estimating a 93% increase in number of web attacks
in the period from 2009 to 2010 [2]. As a result of the previously mentioned
factors it is becomming increasingly difficult for system administrators to keep
up with the ever increasing log sizes produced by IDSs. This problem is am-
plified further by the large number of false positives or otherwise irrelevant
alerts usually produced by the common IDS. Studies have shown that over
90% of the alerts generated by some IDSs may be false positives [3, 4]. When
a system administrator is faced with such large erroneous logs where investi-
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gation must be done at a rapid pace to keep up with newly generated alerts,
the risk of missing out on real security threats becomes problematic. The high
orrucence of false postivives when investigating possible intrusions can also
be demotivating and tedious for the administrator.
Network awareness in intrusion detection is not a recently proposed idea.
Some IDS vendors such as Cisco with the no longer sold Cisco Threat Re-
sponse 2.0 (CRT)[5] and Tenable Network Security with their Lighting Con-
sole 2.0 (product discontinued and product page removed) have provided so-
lutions with the ability to scan and investigate the protected network, in order
to verify the validity of alerts for almost 10 years. When these features were
introduced they were widely considered to be somewhat unsophisticated, re-
lying on time and resource heavy active scanning techniques to familiarize
themselves with the network topology.
In later years, other IDS entrepreneurs have shown interest in the benefits their
networks can gain from keeping track of the system under protection[6, 7].
More commercially available software products have since been implemented
with improved network awareness capabilities. One example of this can be
seen in the popular Sourcefire 3D solution which now boasts components pro-
viding Real-time User Awareness (RUA)[8] and Real-time Network Aware-
ness (RNA)[9]. Using the information gathered by these additions, events can
be further investigated automatically by the IDS to verify the likelihood of an
attack being successful, as well as providing more verbose alerts of what users
were involved and weaknesses were exploited.
Common for the existing solutions however is the fact that they are commer-
cially available and closed source software. As a result, there is little informa-
tion freely available on this topic. This makes it difficult for less resourceful





The main purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate a proof of concept addition
to intrusion detection systems. This proof of concept will be demonstrated by
implementing a prototype solution, introducing network and context aware-
ness to IDS with the purpose of reducing the number of erroneous alerts.
The three following research questions will be answered in this project:
I. In what way can existing open source software tools best be used for
collecting host information relevant to intrusion detection in a network?
II. How can the collected host information be applied to the alerts produced
by signature based IDS such as Snort?
III. What are the benefits and drawbacks of introducing network awareness
in an IDS, effectively making it a target based IDS?
1.1.2 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 provides background information on some key concepts pertaining
to the work done in this project as well as information on the current state of
the art in this topic.
Chapter 3 describes a number of different approaches to solving the problem
statements provided above.
Chapter 4 describes how the prototype was implemented and tested
Chapter 5 displays the results from the testing stage as well as some informa-
tion on the results
Chapter 6 contains a discussion of the approach, design, implementation and
testing, as well as a discussion of possible future work
Chapter 7 summarizes the work done in this report and draws conclusions
based on the answers found in each of the research questions. Some of the





This chapter introduces the reader to some of the concepts and technologies used in
this project.
2.1 A brief review of Intrusion Detection Systems
2.1.1 Signature based IDS
When a new security threat is discovered, a signature spesificly matching the
patterns of the packets involved are produced to be used in a signature based
IDS. Each packet passing through the IDS can then be compared with a set of
known threats in order to determine if the traffic is malicious or legitimate. If
the traffic matches one of the known signatures, an alert is generated and ad-
ministrator is made aware of a possible security problem. An ordinary IDS is
unable to investigate whether or not the threat is real, and so an administrator
must manually investigate each alert to determine their validity.
A common tactic amongst automated attacks is to rapidly target random IP
addresses in succession, attempting to exploit a set of frequently found vul-
nerabilities. Such attacks will, if matching a signature in the IDS be flagged as
malicious traffic regardless of their success, leading to a high number of alerts
corresponding to unsuccessful attack attempts. This inability to automatically
determine the success, or even the possibility of a successful attack is the root
cause of the poor true positive to false positive ratios in signature based IDS.
8
2.1. A BRIEF REVIEWOF INTRUSIONDETECTION SYSTEMS
Consider a system consisting of publicly available Microsoft IIS web servers
being targeted by an attacker. The attacker attempts to gain access to the ma-
chine using a buffer overflow attack designed to exploit a bug found in early
Apache 2 versions in Ubuntu. Since neither the attacker nor the IDS has any
information about the target machine, an alert is generated implying that the
machine may have been compromised. In reality the attack could never have
succeeded, but the system administrator will have to manually investigate the
event.
If the IDS had known what systems the specific attack was designed for as
well as the configuration of the target machine, the event could have been
automatically ignored or an alert been generatedwith lower priority, allowing
the administrator to work more efficiently.
To remedy these problems in such systems, it is common to spend a significant
amount of time tailoring the IDS configuration to the system under protection.
This could include removing signatures relating to Windows exploits in an
environment consisting only of Linux servers, or perhaps specifying IP ad-
dresses and ports for certain IDS rules, for example defining which ports are
used for HTTP servers. This approach is not without problems however, as
even minor changes in the network topology or host configurations may lead
to a miss-configured IDS where real attacks slip through. This means that the
IDS configuration must change as the network changes in order to produce
alerts according to expectations, and so this means that the system adminis-
trator must repeat the same tasks many times over.
2.1.2 Anomaly based IDS
A major issue with any signature based system stems from the fact that any
new threat must be identified, patterns written in the form of a signature and
finally distributed to the systems in order for detection to be possible. In con-
trast, anomaly based IDS attempt to determine what normal network traffic
looks like, allowing the system to categorize the network traffic and detect de-
viations from what is perceived as normal. This means the systemwill be able
to handle zero-day attacks or otherwise unidentified attacks. Anomaly based
IDSs are not without their problems however, as they struggle greatlywith cor-
rectly categorizing traffic in most real systems. Commonly anomaly based IDS
have even greater problems with false positives than signature based systems.
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2.1.3 Next generation IDS/Firewall
“Next generation” is a buzzword frequently used by network security ven-
dors. It usually implies that the product offers entirely new capabilities in
comparison to the existing solutions. Presently, from a network security point
of view, these solutions usually include some way of providing context aware-
ness by bringing together various solutions which have previously been sepa-
rated, such as inventory or configuration databases, LDAP or Active Directory.
The next generation IDS and firewall solutions work towards allowing more
fine grained control of security policies andwhat parts of an application or ser-
vice should be allowed by which users and at what locations. An example of
this could be allowing the human resources department of a workplace access
to the company’s page on a social media site during work hours.
One of the recurring problems in many companies are related to users or em-
ployees circumventing company security policies either for convenience, effi-
ciency or to be able to properly do their jobs. Cases like this is what the next
generation systems work towards solving, as pointed out by Cisco’s Senior
Vice President[10].
Another challenge next generation products are working on is the increased
use of encryption, especially on web services such as Gmail and Facebook
where preventing session hijacking is imperative. In order for an IDS to in-
spect encrypted packets, they must first be decrypted, which requires cooper-
ating with the local machine transferring the encrypted data. In 2011, Koch[11]
investigated the requirements of a next generation IDS and the motivations for
such a system.
2.1.4 Host and network IDS
Generally there are two different approaches to deployment of an IDS, each
with their strong and weak points. By implementing an IDS on a host (HIDS)
and allowing it access to the various files on the system, log files, an overview
of running processes, their versions and network sockets as well as operating
system details, better decisions can be made on whether a threat is real or not
than what is normally possible in a network based IDS (NIDS). With direct
access to the host, it is also possible to verify file integrity or detect when files
have been added or removed, which again can help determine the success of
an attack.
On the other hand, a NIDS has an advantage when it comes to detecting wide
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spread attacks on several machines in the network. Consider a case where
an attacker is scanning several neighboring machines in an attempt to iden-
tify weaknesses for exploitation. Another clear benefit of a NIDS is that en-
ables protection of systems on the network regardless of the system adminis-
trator having access to the machines. The importance of this point becomes
clear when considering the large number of networked mobile devices such
as smartphones, laptops and tablets commonly used in institutions and work-
places.
2.1.5 False positives and false negatives
As earlier mentioned, Intrusion Detection Systems are prone to producing
both false positives and false negatives. False positives, or type I errors oc-
cur when alerts are incorrectly generated where they should not have been,
and while false negatives, or type II errors occur where malicious traffic does
not raise an alert. These errors cannot be completely eliminated as long as we
do not have correct signatures for all malicious traffic, while also having all
corresponding host information available. Hence the best result we can hope
for in such a systemwould be working towards reducing how frequently they
occur.
Depending on the systemand its context, the exact definition ofwhat is consid-
ered a false positive may change. An alert may be considered a false positive if
it was triggered by legitimate traffic containing the same signature as what we
have defined as illegitimate traffic. Generalized signatures designed to match
a variety of patterns are generally more prone to such errors than signatures
matching a specific payload. Furthermore, an IDS may generate what could
be considered an irrelevant alert. These irrelevant alerts are triggered by real
illegitimate traffic, which due to their context are not interesting to the system
administrator. This could for example be because the given traffic holds no sig-
nificance when transmitted to a certain target. Such a scenario is mentioned
briefly in subsection 2.1.1.
By adding another layer of signature based fingerprinting to the system, in
order to gather host information for better decisions, we also introduce another
error source. This can be seen to hold true for example in a scenario where a
host is incorrectly assumed to be unaffected by an exploit, while it in reality is
affected by it. This means that the host could be compromised without the IDS
raising an alert, in this case causing a type II error which may not otherwise
occur in an IDS system with manual alert verification.
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2.2 A brief review of fingerprinting techniques
As the fingerprinting term suggests, it is concerned with identification of a tar-
get. Traditionally, scanning and fingerprinting tools have been useful to both
network administrators and intruders looking for policy violations, weaknesses
and security holes, as well as general network information. With the help of
these tools one can learn a great deal about the hosts residing in the network.
Examples being which services are listening to what ports, which ports are
closed and which platform they are running on. In some cases further infor-
mation about version numbers can also be extracted. All of this is valuable
information whether one wishes to attack or defend a host.
Common for all fingerprinting techniques is that we require knowledge of
what the traffic looks like for a given application or operating system in or-
der for them to be identified. When done through a set of known signatures,
the fingerprinting system becomes prone to false positives. If different sys-
tems produce similar datagrams, it may be difficult to distinguish them from
another. An example of this can be problems distinguishing a Windows Vista
machine from a machine running Windows 7 due to their many similarities.
2.2.1 Active fingerprinting
Active fingerprinting has long been used in well known network scanning
tools such as Nmap[12], Nessusweb:nessus, THC Amap[13] and others. Com-
mon for the active fingerprinting techniques is that they generate network
traffic. By sending packets to various ports and services running on a host,
the response, or lack of response can often provide much information about
the system. Active fingerprinting is however not without its flaws and weak-
nesses. It is not uncommon for experienced server operators to take measures
to defend against such scans and greatly reducing the amount of information
sent back to the scanning machine[14].
As a direct result of how the active scanning techniques work, they can cause
the generation of significant network noise. Due to the time and resources
it takes to scan a large number of ports and hosts, the scalability of active
scanning techniques is also a concern. Furthermore, it would be reasonable
to assume that the scanning systems’ response time to changes in the network
topology would also suffer.
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2.2.2 Passive fingerprinting
Passive fingerprinting is a different approach to achieving the same goal. Tools
such as PRADS[15], p0f[16] and Ettercap[17] have been developed to serve a
need for network silence, requiring no additional network traffic to be gener-
ated. By reading package headers and contents from normal network traffic,
these tools can often make precise guesses on what services the hosts on the
network are providing. This solution operates very well in conjunction with
an IDS machine where the network packages already pass through and are
inspected by the machine.
2.3 Network Address Translation (NAT)
NAT is the process of modifying the information as defined in an Internet Pro-
tocol (IP) datagram. Commonly the IP address and/or port is modified, al-
lowing a packet sent to one machine to be redirected to another host on the
network. NAT has played an important role in the decline in available IPv4
addresses, and so is very widespread in many networks. NAT lets multiple
machines behind a gateway utilize a single IP address by translating their pri-
vate IP addresses to an external shared address as the packets pass through the
gateway. Typically NAT is implemented by default in home and smaller busi-
ness routers. Furthermore, NAT is used extensively in virtualized systems,
where one might have hundreds or even thousands of machines sharing one
or several IP addresses.
This may cause problems with any system attempting to define a host as an IP
address. Rather than only using an IP address, it may be necessary to define a
host as a combination of an IP address, port and protocol or any other property
used for translating packets. Using the popular Linux firewall iptables[18], it
is easy to define forwarding rules redirecting packets using these three char-
acteristics. As an example, a package destined for the IP address 128.39.73.8
on port 1234, using the TCP protocol may be sent to an Ubuntu 10.10 host
running an Apache2 web server. Meanwhile a similar packet headed for the
same IP address and protocol, but using 1235 as port number might end up at
a Windows 2008 machine running an IIS server.
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2.4 Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
One of the features of DHCP is that it lets unused IP addresses and other
network information be assigned to new hosts on the network automatically.
These addresses are often referred to as dynamic addresses, and is very help-
ful to seamlessly adding and removing mobile devices or hosts that do not
provide a service to the network. This poses a challenge to systems seeking to
track hosts though IP addresses, as the network may be constantly changing.
An IP address assigned to a host that is fingerprinted as a Windows machine
may for example refer to a Linux machine only moments later.
2.5 Previous work
The effort of bringing contextual or network awareness to the open source IDS
solutions has been relatively unsuccessful, as can be seen from the fact that
popular solutions such as Snort[19], Suricata and Bro[20] have yet to imple-
ment these features. Snort offers some means of describing host information
in a network through their Host Attribute Table, it however relies on 3rd party
software or manual inspection to provide the information. Snort is also very
limited in how it makes use of the information. For the most part this solution
provides a way to ease configuration, by automatically selecting which alerts
will be used for which hosts, at the expense of maintaining an XML file with
the host information. In order to alleviate some of the work required in main-
taining such a file, some scripts have been written to translate the results of an
Nmap or PRADS scan into a Host Attribute Table XML format[21, 22].
Snort’s commercial parent, Sourcefire, has for many years been equipped with
modules for providing real-time user and network awareness. Other competi-
tors such as Palo Alto networks[23] and Cisco[24] are also heavily investing in
providing contextual awareness for their solutions, however due to their com-
mercial nature, few details are freely available on how these solutions specifi-
cally work.
Several different approaches have been attempted throughout the past 8 years
to explore ways of reducing the number of false positives being generated in
both Snort and general IDS implementations. In 2004, Kruegel et al[25]. inves-
tigated the possibilities of automatically validating alerts by actively scanning
or accessing the host directly in real-time. The active scanning was done using
Nessus[26], while the authenticated access was able to assure basic file and
process integrity checks. Although not treated as a major concern, using both
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of these methods in real-time as alerts are generated is slow in comparison to
using already existing data from a local database.
Realizing that the majority of network traffic is web related, Karaarslan et
al[27]. implemented a system for reducing false positive occurrences from
web-attacks in 2006. This was done using a hybrid solution, utilizing both
passive and an active fingerprinting techniques. It was concluded that ac-
tively scanning an entire network continuously would not be practical due to
scalability issues and time constraints, and so their prototype was limited to a
small set of commonweb ports. In otherwords such an implementationwould
not be feasible in a system where other protocols than HTTP are in use. Fur-
thermore the passive fingerprinting portion was implemented using a custom
Perl script, rather than publicly available tools. The passive fingerprintingwas
done by analyzing packages and looking for common web applications such
as asp and php.
A third independent group explored the benefits of utilizing host data already
present in a Configuration Management Database (CMDB) in 2008 [28]. A
prototype based on Snort was tested on a known Internet Service Provider
(ISP) network with real traffic, where all the hosts were described in detail in a
CMDB. Because of this the prototypewas shown to operate exceptionally well.
The main concern in this system was the lack of detailed target definitions for
some Snort rules, meaning the system was unable to make a decision.
In 2009, Sourour et al. brought up some important points concerning active
scanning techniques[29]. It is noted that scanning can be intrusive or non-
intrusive. While an intrusive scan would usually provide better information
for the IDS, it is also more likely to interrupt the service, causing more prob-
lems than it solves. A solution is provided, implementing a solution closely
tied to the Snort core, which relies on a host based Linux agent able to contin-
uously extract all relevant host information. While the close ties to the Snort
core allows this solution to operate in IPSmode as well as IDSmode, the paper
does not discuss the assumption that a host based agent on every system to be
protected is unreasonable.
A different attempt at reducing the number of false positives in a web was
made by Mark Wierbosch in 2011[30]. Since the implementation discussed
here is only concerned with unencrypted HTTP traffic, it is possible to use
packet headers, HTTP status codes, user agent information and URLs to ex-
tract relevant information. This offers some benefits for decision making that
would otherwise be unavailable in other IDS systems concerned with a vari-
ety of protocols. In contrast to other similar efforts, this implementation does
not make use of operative system detection nor software and version num-
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bers, however it is mentioned as a possible future improvement. Although the
paper mentions using information reported by the web servers, it does not ap-
pear to recognize the fact that this information often can be spoofed with very
little effort.
In addition to these attempts at reducing the number of false positives in IDS,
additional research has been done on attempts to reduce the number of alerts
reported as a whole. In 2007, Al-Mamory et al[31]. did a survey on the theoret-
ical backgrounds of several methods of processing IDS alerts, focusing heavily
on alert correlation. Amongst the discussed solutions were alert aggregation
by grouping together similar alerts, finding the root cause of redundant alarms
which are often caused bymisconfiguration, and also a machine learning tech-
nique.
Spathoulas et al[32]. has an interesting approach where characteristics such
as the fact that many attacks often probe several neighboring machines on a
network to find vulnerable targets, and the fact that they usually have a rec-
ognizable alert distribution are taken advantage of. Rather than filtering false
positives out, true positives are “filtered in” using these characteristics. Since
the approach is heavily based on observed alert distributions and expected at-
tack characteristics, it is prone to erroneous decisions where real attacks are
removed when the assumptions are not met.
2.6 Where does this thesis fit in?
By providing the necessary host and rule information for making better deci-
sions to the IDS, the hope is to drastically improve the false positive to true
positive ratios. In turn, it is assumed that this will help improving both the re-
sponse times and work gratification for the system administrator tasked with
investigating the alerts. Furthermore, allowing the IDS to automatically make
better decisions based on basic rule and host information will improve the out-
of-the-box state of an IDS, reducing the amount of time spent on both initial
configuration and maintaining the IDS. Most system administrators recognize
the importance of automating and eliminating tedious day-to-day tasks. As
such, both the false positive reduction and less dependency on configuration
should be well received by the system administration community.
The proposed implementationwill bring together existing free and open source
solutions in a useful and reproduceable manner. Additionally, the results will
demonstratewhether or not such an implementation is helpful and to what ex-
tent. More research in this area of intrusion detection systems will also hope-
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fully help bring more attention to its benefits, and thereby giving incentive for
IDS developers do adopt such a solution.
Another side effect of bringing context and network awareness to the current
open source IDS systems, is that it will bring them closer to what is commonly
perceived as “next generation” IDS. Once network awareness is available it
would not require as much effort to further expand the solution to for example




In this chapter the various approaches are discussed in order to find the most suitable
way to solve the research problems as well as providing a fixed plan for the project.
3.1 Introduction
There are many possible approaches to providing answers to the problem
statements discussed in chapter one. Furthermore it is necessary to identify
the functionality required by the system and how it can be realized. It is also
important that the effect of the final results can be evaluated formally in order
to determine the success of the study. The approach seeks to bring to light any
problems with the different approaches, so that they can be avoided at an early
stage of the project.
3.2 Preliminary decisions
One of the first decisions to be made is whether to create a new network IDS
with the proposed network awareness feature, or provide an addition to an
already existing tool. Given the time constraints for this project, it seems
unlikely that implementing a new unsophisticated IDS for testing purposes
would be beneficial. Time spent on designing, implementing and testing such
a system could be better spent focusing on the new feature. Snort[19] and
Bro[20] are both mature open source projects in active development, and are
both attractive options for use in this project. Having previous experiencewith
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the Snort IDS and general familiarity with this software means that more time
can be spent on implementing the prototype. The great popularity of Snort
and the excellent official as well as third party documentation is bound to be
helpful should problems arise at a later stage of the project.
In 2011, Jonas Taftø Rødfoss[33] explored three popular IDSs. After taking into
consideration the problems he experiencedusing Bro in a similar environment,
Snort was selected as the primary choice in this project. Both Snort and Bro
are single threaded applications, though high performance is not considered a
high priority in this proof of concept implementation.
3.2.1 Data collection
Collecting host information from each networked host under our IDS’s pro-
tection is an integral part of the proposed network awareness feature. Chapter
2 mentions two different ways of collecting host information by reading data-
grams and comparing them to a set of known patterns, commonly referred to
as signatures.
Active fingerprinting
The active approach, relying on sending a stimuli to the target, hoping to pro-
voke a specific response is perhaps the most effective solution. Being able to
control the stimuli being sent to the target is very beneficial, because it often
allows us to trigger a certain expected response. This in contrast to relying on
normal network traffic to generate the necessary data when passively finger-
printing.
Some drawbacks of active scanning were also mentioned in chapter 2. In or-
der to ensure that all target information is available when determining the
validity of an alert, it is necessary to either continuously scan all hosts, on all
ports, on various protocols, or actively scan the target during the validation
process when one knows where and what to scan for. Clearly the continuous
approach would allow us to already have the data at hand when needed, al-
lowing for quick decisions when data has already been collected. The data
collection process itself however would grow rapidly as the number of hosts
increases, meaning it would not be scalable. Actively scanning as a part of the
validation process on the other hand would be expected to slow it down sig-




The other approach mentioned, passive fingerprinting, does not necessarily
have either of these problems. The packages already passing through and be-
ing read by the IDS host can be used for fingerprinting, allowing for excellent
scalability. This of course means that no host will be visible by the system
until an appropriate package has triggered a signature in the fingerprinting
system. As mentioned in the background chapter, another benefit of the pas-
sive approach is that it is completely silent on the network, allowing for a very
stealthy and “clean” system.
Host based agent
There are however other ways to collect host information besides the above
mentioned fingerprinting methods. One of these methods relies on authenti-
cated access to each host we would like to extract host information from, and
is perhaps the most obvious as well. By installing a script, hereby referred to
as an “agent” on each target machine we are able to extract extensive and re-
liable information. On most Linux machines for example this could be done
by creating a script to extract detailed information about the operating system,
running applications listening for incoming traffic, as well as sockets, versions
and even patches.
As mentioned in the background chapter however, it would be unreasonable
in many networks to assume that we have full access to every host on the net-
work. Scalability is also a concern with such an implementation, as the agent
would have to be installed on each target. This burden could of course be
managed efficiently by utilizing a configuration management system such as
the widely used Cfengine[34] or Puppet[35]. Another possibility could be to
install the agent though a Pre-boot Execution Environment (PXE)[36], which
allows several machines to be set up with identical initial configurations auto-
matically over a network.
Furthermore, with an agent residing on the host it collects information from,
the system may be exposed to employees or other users tempering with the
system. In essence, this means that users, depending on their access rightsmay
be able to for example change the files the system reads data from, or change
the output returned by certain commands. A rogue employee may therefore
be able to control which alerts are being displayed to the system administrator
for that host by making the IDS think a given alert would not be applicable to
that target. By manipulating files the agent relies on so that the agent reports a
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different operating system is present, alerts against this hostmay be incorrectly
presumed to be irrelevant by the system.
While this might seem like a minor concern at first, respectable sources such
as Verizon[37] and Computer Security Institute (CSI)[38] both recognize the
danger of insider threats, although to different extents. The reported figures
differ greatly, due to different data sources and difference in what is perceived
as an insider attack.
Configuration Management Database
A final approach, utilizing a Configuration Management Database would al-
low the system to verify alerts triggered by traffic to any host defined in the
database. This solution however shares some concerns with the agent based
solution, as the system will know nothing about hosts not managed by the
configuration management system. Furthermore, it is not uncommon that ma-
chines are only partially managed by the configuration management system,
meaning that the systemmay only know about a small set of services running.
As briefly mentioned in the related work section, this solution was investi-
gated by Pimenidis et al. in [28] with excellent results, largely due to having a
good Configuration Management Database available.
3.2.2 PRADS - Passive Real-time Asset Detection System
The passive fingerprinting method was chosen after carefully considering the
pros and cons of the various data collection methods, as discussed above. The
scalability and stealthiness, and of course the fact that very little public re-
search appears to have been done in this specific area. It is hoped that by using
the passive approach, the proof of concept in this project will provide a more
realistic implementation than the previous attempts at network awareness in
IDS mentioned in the previous work section.
There are several publicly available and open source passive fingerprinting
tools. PADS (Passive Asset Detection System), not to be confusedwith PRADS,
is an old tool, discontinued in 2005 and mainly focused on detecting active
services on the network, rather than determining which operating system is
running. On the other hand, p0fv2 is popular signature based operating sys-
tem fingerprinting tool, last updated in 2006. Inspired by these two, PRADS
was implemented and is still in active development. This tool is able to use
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signatures from p0fv2 and PRADS directly, and is able to detect both services
and operating systems.
Very recently, p0fv3[16] was announced as a complete rewrite of the previous
version. Since this tool is still very immature and also incompatible with pre-
vious signatures, it was not considered a viable option for this project. In the
future however when a sufficient amount of signatures have been provided,
this tool could be a very attractive option.
SinFP[39] is a passive fingerprinting tool, which explicitly states that it recog-
nizes the limitations in other similar tools when dealing with Network Ad-
dress Translation. Like p0fv2/v3 however, this tool is only able to detect oper-
ating systems, and would therefore have to run in addition to either PADS or
PRADS to get a full overview.
For these reasons, PRADS was chosen to be the primary data collection tool in
this system.
3.3 Lab environment
In order to test the proof of concept and verify its success (or failure), it will be
necessary to run Snort on a network in order to generate some alerts. It is as-
sumed that having a large number of hosts and alerts, with both true and false
positives amongst them will make it easier to determine the effect of the pro-
posed feature. A lab environment is provided by HiOA with several hundred
machines with public IP addresses as depicted in figure 3.1. A large portion
of the servers reside in virtualized environments used by students in various
courses. For the most part these virtual networks consists of one Ubuntu host
with a public IP address, serving as a gateway for one Windows XP or Win-
dows 7 host, and possibly additional Ubuntu or Debian servers. This means
that it will be critical that the prototype is able to handle Network Address
Translation in a meaningful way.
By configuring a “span port” on the main switch, all packets passing through
its outgoing port will be mirrored and sent to the server running Snort and the
fingerprinting software. This way, this host will be able to sniff and analyze
all traffic passing through this choke-point by configuring the network card to
run in promiscuous mode. This second network card does not require an IP
address in order to listen to the traffic being sent to it by the switch. By sev-
ering the other connection from the switch to the network card labeled eth0,
the machine would be extremely difficult to compromise for an attacker, but
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require the system administrator to have physical access. These are important
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running Snort on eth1
Figure 3.1: The lab environment used for testing the prototype.
3.4 Prototype
The first step necessary in order to evaluate the effectiveness of adding “net-
work awareness” to an intrusion detection system is to develop a prototype
with such a feature. As previously mentioned Snort was selected to be the IDS
in which the new feature will be added. Snort is able to operate in either in-
line mode, otherwise known as intrusion prevention mode, or as an intrusion
detection system. For an IDS to run in in-line mode, it is imperative that the
system is as efficient as possible when deciding whether to allow a packet to
pass through or if it should be intercepted. As can be seen from the lab en-
vironment shown in figure 3.1, running the prototype on an IPS system will
not be possible, as all traffic passing through the switch is simply copied and
sent to the second network card on the machine labeled sonic.vlab.iu.hio.no.
Furthermore, it would not be desirable to test such a system in a production
environment. For these reasons IPS mode will not be considered in this project




Commonly Snort is configured to log all alerts to a binary file, rather than
inserting the data directly in a database. This is done to improve the Snort
performance, reducing the chance of packets being dropped by the system.
Barnyard2 is a program which compliments Snort by running at certain inter-
vals, parsing the binary data and inserting it into a database such as MySQL.
There are a few possible ways to ensure that new alerts are validated against
the host information database(s). Firstly, we could modify Snorts source code
directly so that the validation is done as a part of Snorts alert generation pro-
cess. Barnyard2 could then be modified to handle the new data accordingly
and insert it into the database along with the default information. This how-
ever would be a difficult task, as the Snort and Barnyard2 source is written in
C and also rather complicated.
An easier implementation would be having an external program which is able
to run at certain intervals, or be triggered at the same time Barnyard2 is exe-
cuted. It should be noted however that some systems use SMS or Email warn-
ings when certain incidents happen, and such warnings should not be issued
until after the validation process is done. In other systems it is common to
use a web interface to view IDS alerts. In such a system the validation process
might not be as time sensitive, as new alerts could simply be displayed as not
yet validated for a few seconds.
The planned systemdesign is described in figure 3.2. The Perl script validator.
pl provides the new functionality by comparing information about a given
alert to the host information of the target. The script can be written in a mod-
ular way, so that it can utilize various host information sources. Information
about the various rules and the systems they are applicable to can be gathered
from various websites such as the Common Vulnerability Database (CVD)[40],
the Snort home page[19] or Bugtraq[41].
Perl is a widely used high-level interpreted programming language, favored
by many system administrators due to the ease of implementing advanced
functionality with minimal work. Perl is also well known for having strong
text processing aptitudes, which will be important in this project as it will rely
heavily on processing and comparing strings. Through the Comprehensive
Perl Archive Network (CPAN)[42], Perl modules are provided for common
tasks such as interacting with databases or establishing network connections.
These modules can be easily installed from the command line on demand and
used in Perl programs.
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Figure 3.2: Proposed system design for the prototype.
3.5 Testing the prototype
After carefully designing and implementing a prototypewith the desired func-
tionality, it is crucial that we test it in the lab environment and that the results
will be able to provide answers to the problem statements. At first, the com-
mand line tool tcpdump will be used to sniff, collect and log all the packages
traversing the main switch to a log file which can be read and analyzed at a
later point. Once the binary file has grown sufficiently large, it can be inter-
preted and analyzed by Snort and PRADS in order to produce Snort alerts and
PRADS host information. The Perl script validator.pl can then be executed,
and proceed to estimate the relevance of each alert.
We may then compare the default Snort alerts with the validated alerts. The
success of the proof of concept will be determined based on how well the new
information added to each alert allows the system administrator to separate
the relevant alerts from the irrelevant alerts. The desired outcome will be that
the alerts are categorized according to how one might expect to categorize





This chapter describes what was done during the implementation stage, as well as how
it was done. Choices made during implementation are also documented here along
with their reasons.
4.1 Lab setup
With the purpose of improving the reproducibility of the system and the ex-
periments performed in this project, some of the details regarding the software
setup and their configurations are described in the following sections. Default
configurations can be assumed to be omitted from this report.
The host referred to as sonic.vlab.iu.hio.no in figure 3.1 had properties as





Machine model Dell PowerEdge 2850 Server
Processor 64-bit Intel Xeon CPU 2.80GHz (Dual core)
RAM 4x 512MB + 2x 1024MB DDR2 at 400 MHz
NIC 2x Intel 82541GI Controller with 1 Gbit/s capacity
Operating system Ubuntu 11.10 Oneiric Ocelot x86 64
Linux kernel 3.0.0-12-server
Table 4.1: Server properties
4.1.1 Snort
Snort version 2.9.2.1 and its prerequisite data acquisition API DAQ version 0.6.2
were installed from source with the following options.
./ configure --prefix =/ usr/local/snort --enable -perfprofiling --
enable -decoder -preprocessor -rules --enable -ppm --enable -
sourcefire
Code 4.1: Snort compile options
In previous versions, Snort required tweaking of several compile options to
operate optimally, however in recent versions these settings have been made
default. Snort was then configured to log its output to a unified2 format bi-
nary file for further processing by Barnyard2. Barnyard2 was then configured
to read the unified2 format files and insert the data into a MySQL database.
An official Snort rule set from april 12, 2012 was used, with the exception of
the precompiled rules which were dismissed.
The default rule sets policy.rules and file-identify.rules provided sev-
eral hundred signatures referring to possible policy violations such as suspi-
cious DNS queries, BitTorrent downloads and cloud storage synchronization
traffic. Another problematic rule set was the icmp-info.rulesfile, which con-
tained almost 100 different ICMP traffic signatures, many of which were gen-
eral ping requests and replies. These alert files were disabled since they were
not interesting for testing the alert validation feature, since a simple ICMP
echo request is valid against any target able to handle the ICMP protocol.
These alerts served little purpose besides generating several thousand alerts
per hour.
Due to the high number of connections Snort had to track when analyzing the
network traffic, some tweaking had to be done to allocate more memory to
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the the Stream5 preprocessor. The modified line is shown in code listing 4.2
with the new memcap value, which was set to 16 times higher than default.
After these modifications no error messages were shown and packages were
no longer being dropped when Snort could not keep up.
preprocessor stream5_global : track_tcp yes , memcap 134217728,
track_udp yes , track_icmp no , max_tcp 262144 , max_udp 131072 ,
max_active_responses 2, min_response_seconds 5
Code 4.2: Modifications to the snort.conf file
4.2 Prototype implementation
A prototype was implemented in Perl, which analyzes each alert produced
by Snort and compares them to data gathered by PRADS as well as informa-
tion about the signature which triggered the alert. The final implementation
of this prototype can be seen in its entirety in appendix A. The early system
overview depicted in figure 3.2 shows that the prototype has access to a host
information database (in green). This database could hold information from
several different sources, with varying degrees of correctness. The way the
final prototype was implemented, a single host data source from the host in-
formation database is used at a time. As mentioned in the approach chapter,
PRADS was chosen as the host data collection tool, however any source could
be used without program modifications as long as the database follows the
same format as PRADS.
Initially, the intent was to design the prototype in a way that allowed it to au-
tomatically gather all the information necessary tomake appropriate decisions
using already existing datasources. This however proved very difficult or even
impossible given the time frame for the project. The problems with automati-
cally gathering signature and host information as well as the solutions to these
problems are described in subsection 4.2.1 and subsection 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Gathering signature information
Most Snort rules contain references to online sources where information about
the given vulnerability is described. Frequently occurring references include
Microsoft technet security bulletins[43], Bugtraq[41], Common Vulnerability
Database (CVD)[40] and Snort’s home page [19]. There is no standard for how
these references should provide the information, and so it varies greatly what
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information is displayed and how it is structured. Of the previously men-
tioned reference sites, CVD had a clear advantage in that it offered a down-
loadable database in several formats including XML and comma separated
values (CSV). This was attractive because it meant the script would not rely on
Internet access for lookups.
The prototype would then have the goal of providing a best-effort service
given the host, signature and alert data which was available to the program.
What this meant was that the prototype could not guarantee that every alert
which has corresponding host and signature information would be validated
based on this data with as good results as when a human was doing the same
job. Given the complexity of the often arbitrary data the prototypewould have
to read and understand, it would utilize this information with as much preci-
sion as a “dumb” program would permit.
To better understandwhy the prototypewould inherit this limitation, consider
a Snort alert with a corresponding CVD vulnerability description as seen in
code 4.3. A human reader might be able to deduce that the version numbers
mentioned refer to Adobe Flash Player, rather than a version number for the
Linux Kernel, despite the fact that the numbers are directly following “Linux”
in the description. This reasoning would be possible if one knew that the most
recent kernel version as of time of writing was 3.0.31, much lower than the
number seen in the description.
Unspecified vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player for Linux
10.0.12.36, and 9.0.151.0 and earlier , allows remote
attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted SWF file .
Code 4.3: CVD description from the ID CVE-2008-5499 (SID 15869)
Similarly, the Snort website produced the information seen in code 4.4 about
the same rule. Note also that the section headers such as “Affected Systems”
used on the Snort page were missing from several rules.
Summary
This event i s generated when an attempt i s made to e xp l o i t a
known vu lne r ab i l i t y in Flash Player fo r Linux .
Impact
Denial of Se rv i ce . Information d i s c l o sure . Loss of i n t e g r i t y .
Complete admin access .
Detailed Information
Unspeci f ied vu lne r ab i l i t y in Adobe Flash Player fo r Linux
1 0 . 0 . 1 2 . 3 6 , and 9 . 0 . 1 5 1 . 0 and ea r l i e r , al lows remote a t t a ck e r s
to execute a r b i t r a r y code via a c r a f t ed SWF f i l e .
Affected Systems










Upgrade to the l a t e s t non−a f f e c t ed vers ion of the software .
Apply the appropr ia te vendor supplied patches .
Code 4.4: Snort.org vulnerability description from the SID 15869
It was clear that the data in the signature references was intended to be read
by humans rather than a program. Traditionally IDS tools have used web in-
terfaces such as BASE[44] or other ways to directly query the alert database or
log file. Since these alerts are then manually investigated by a human reader,
it hasn’t been a high enough priority to provide an API or strict format on the
external alert information.
To solve these problems, a new table (vulnerabilityinfo) was created in the
Snort database providing strictly formatted vulnerability information for each
alert seen by the system. The information in this table was gathered by man-
ually inspecting the references for each unique rule triggered by Snort during
testing. This solution was possible since only a few rules were triggered by
Snort, and would not be a practical implementation for longer Snort runs in a
real world scenario.
The format for target vulnerabilities was defined closely matching the struc-
ture already present for some fingerprints used for operating systems in PRADS.
Two examples of this format can be seen in code 4.5. One or several operating
systems with zero or more corresponding versions could be defined this way.
The same formatting was used for service definitions.
operating system 1: firstversion /secondversion !operating system 2
service 1: version 1! service 2: version 1/ version 2
Code 4.5: Definition format used in vulnerabilityinfo
Oneminor limitation imposed by this format however, was that services could
not be defined per operating system type. This would be problematic if the
same vulnerability was present in the TFTP client FileZilla on Windows and
the TFTP client VSFTPD on Linux for example. Such cases are very rare how-
ever and no such vulnerabilities were encountered during testing, and so this
limitation had no practical impact for this report.
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Generally when designing databases it is advisable that each value is defined
atomically. This means that the data cannot be further split into new values.
The information held in the vulnerabilityinfo table can clearly be represented
separately in some cases. It would be possible to have one operating systemon
each row, rather than one row with multiple operating systems. There would
however be little to gain from doing this in this particular system, due to the
large number of additional reference tables required to represent the informa-
tion in the sameway. This is because of the interdependencies on the operating
system, service and version fields for the various vulnerability definitions.
Having all the values in two separate columns with a consistent format for
separating the data using meta characters makes it very easy to extract the
information using regular expressions (regex) in a Perl script.
4.2.2 Gathering host information
PRADS writes its information to a log file with a strictly enforced comma sep-
arated format as seen in code 4.6. The meta tag contains information from the
fingerprint or signature which PRADS detected and which caused the entry to
be written. The service field indicates the fingerprint type. These can be SYN,
SYNACK, RST or FIN depending on the flags set in the TCP datagram, or SERVER
and CLIENT depending on the type of service detected.
ip address ,virtual lan tag ,port number ,protocol number ,service ,[
meta ],distance ,time discovered
Code 4.6: PRADS CSV log format
Code listing 4.7 shows three valid fingerprint entries as seen in the PRADS
log file. Enclosed in the meta character square brackets [ and ] is the infor-
mation we wish to extract. Some of the characteristics of the data within the
brackets are as follows: the number of separating colons : varies slightly, and
most importantly the version string for an operating system varies greatly. In
the second entry, commas , are used as separating characters between the
versions, while the third entry uses a slash / .
128.39.73.* ,0 ,443 ,6 , SYNACK ,[S4 :64:1:52: M1460 ,N,N,S,N,W7:ZA:Linux
:2.6 (newer , 7):link :ethernet /modem ] ,0 ,1328570603
128.39.73.* ,0 ,55076 ,6 ,SYN ,[8192:64:1:48: M*,N,N,S:.: Windows :2000
SP2+, XP SP1+ (seldom 98, Low TTL1 ):link :ethernet /modem:uptime:
1002 hrs ] ,0 ,1328570784
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80.202.171.* ,0 ,61393 ,6 ,SYN ,[8192:119:1:52: M1452 ,N,W2 ,N,N,S:.:
Windows:XP /2000 (RFC1323+, w+, tstamp -):link :pppoe (DSL)]
,9 ,1328570614
Code 4.7: PRADS log example (anonymized IPs)
In order to extract information relevant for making a decision in the validat-
ing program, it is necessary to know where in the fingerprint the data resides,
or what the information we are looking for looks like. That way, we can ex-
tract the substrings we are interested in, using regular expressions (regex).
To achieve this, all fingerprints for both services and operating systems were
modified slightly. A few examples of default PRADS signatures for operating
system detection are shown in code 4.8.
1 S4 :64:1:52: M*,N,N,S,N,W0:ZA:Linux :2.6 or 2.4 w/o timestamps
2 5712:64:1:40: M*,S,T,N,W4:ZAT:Linux :2.6 (newer , 4) IPv6
3 S12 :126:1:52: M*,N,W0 ,N,N,S:A:Windows :2000 (SP1+ Userapp2 ?)(UC)
4 8192:128:1:56: M*,S,T:A:Windows :2000 SP2+, XP SP1+ (seldom 98)
5 65535:64:1:60: M1368 ,N,W3 ,S,T:AT:FreeBSD:FreeBSD 20061110
6 S6 :64:1:60: M1460 ,N,W0 ,N,N,T:AT:BSD/OS :4.0.x
7 33304:64:1:60: M*,N,W0 ,N,N,T:AT:MacOS:X 10.2.6
8 16384:128:0:60: M1460 ,N,W0 ,N,N,T0:A:Akamai :??? (2)
9 16384:128:0:48: M1460 ,N,N,S:A:unknown:something
10 252:128:1:40:.: AFN:Windows: Windows 7/2008 R2
11 0:255:0:40:.:.: Linux :2.0/2.2 or IOS 12.x (dropped)
Code 4.8: Default PRADS OS signatures and fingerprints
The same 11 lines are shown in code 4.9 where the problematic aspects of each
line has been corrected. While modifying the lines, curly brackets { and }
were added surrounding the relevant information, for easier extraction by the
validating program.
1 S4 :64:1:52: M*,N,N,S,N,W0:ZA:{ Linux :2.6/2.4}
2 5712:64:1:40: M*,S,T,N,W4:ZAT :{ Linux :2.6}
3 S12 :126:1:52: M*,N,W0 ,N,N,S:A:{ Windows :2000 SP1+}
4 8192:128:1:56: M*,S,T:A:{ Windows :2000 SP2 +/XP SP1 +/98}
5 65535:64:1:60: M1368 ,N,W3 ,S,T:AT:{ FreeBSD :20061110}
6 S6 :64:1:60: M1460 ,N,W0 ,N,N,T:AT:{ BSD :4.0}
7 33304:64:1:60: M*,N,W0 ,N,N,T:AT:{ MacOS X:10.2.6}
8 16384:128:0:60: M1460 ,N,W0 ,N,N,T0:A:{ Akamai :0}
9 (Removed entirely , no useful information at all)
10 252:128:1:40:.: AFN:{ Windows :7/2008 R2}
11 0:255:0:40:.:.:{ Linux :2.0/2.2! IOS :12}
Code 4.9: Modified PRADS OS signatures and fingerprints
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Words clearly intended for human reading such as “or”, “seldom”, “some-
thing” as well as question marks were removed and replaced by appropriate
meta characters separating the data fields. A similar format to what PRADS
had already been following for some entries was used. To separate multiple
operating systems an exclamation mark ! was used, since PRADS did not
have a meaningful way to separate multiple possible operating systems al-
ready. Furthermore, a colon : was used to separate an operating system from
it’s version, as was already being done by PRADS. To separate the several pos-
sible operating system versions a slash / was used.
The version number 4.0.x was translated to 4.0, and ??? was translated to 0,
meaning we don’t have any version information. Knowing that there might be
an unknown subversion of a service holds no meaning to the prototype, and
might even cause problems when the prototype attempts to compare this ver-
sion to another. Other irrelevant information such as a packet being dropped
or a datagram using IPv6 was simply removed.
Similar modifications were done in the fingerprint files for services for them to
be consistent and also ease data extraction. Code listing 4.10 shows the original
fingerprints followed by a regular expression signature, while code listing 4.11
shows the modified fingerprint.
1 ssh ,v/OpenSSH/$2/Protocol $1/,SSH -([.\d]+) -OpenSSH[_ -](\ S+)
2 http ,v/Apache/$1//, Server: Apache \/([\S]+) [\r\n]
3 http ,v/Apache/$1/$2/,Server: Apache \/([\S]+) [\s]+\((.*) \)
4 http ,v/Microsoft -IIS/$1//, Server: Microsoft -IIS \/([\S]+) [\r\n]
5 http ,v/NetCache //$1/,Server: NetCache (\(.*\) )
6 ftp ,v/Microsoft FTP Server/$1//, Microsoft FTP Service \( Version
([\S]+)\).
7 ftp ,v/Microsoft FTP Server /// ,220 Microsoft FTP Service
Code 4.10: Default PRADS service signatures and fingerprints
1 ssh ,v/{ OpenSSH /:$2}/ Protocol $1/,SSH -([.\d]+) -OpenSSH[_ -](\ S+)
2 http ,v/{ Apache /:$1}//, Server: Apache \/([\S]+) [\r\n]
3 http ,v/{ Apache /:$1}/$2/,Server: Apache \/([\S]+)[\s]+\((.*) \)
4 http ,v/{ Microsoft -IIS/:$1 }//, Server: Microsoft -IIS \/([\S]+)[\r\n]
5 http ,v/{ NetCache }//$1/,Server: NetCache (\(.*\) )
6 ftp ,v/{ Microsoft FTP Server /:$1}//, Microsoft FTP Service \(
Version ([\S]+) \).
7 ftp ,v/{ Microsoft FTP Server }/// ,220 Microsoft FTP Service
Code 4.11: Modified PRADS service signatures and fingerprints
It should also be noted that PRADS removes the / meta character from the
fingerprints when they are reported in the log file, which might cause con-
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fusion when attempting to extract a version number following the service in
some cases. Adding the enclosing meta characters { and } corrected this
problem.
A Perl script (prads2db.pl) included with PRADS was used to insert the log
file data into a MySQL database. After all this was done, the PRADS data was
ready to be used in the prototype through MySQL.
4.2.3 Version number comparison
Version numbers and version names are used to provide unique identifiers
of a software’s development state and is common to virtually all software.
There are many conventions and standards amongst different organizations
and communities, noteworthy examples being the GNU/Linux community
and Microsoft developers. A very common way to present version numbers
is through a sequence based identifier such as 9.0.7.1. Each sequential num-
ber has special meanings, which may vary entirely dependent on the software
author. This version number could sometimes be interpreted as follows:
• The first number (9), usually refers to a major version of the software,
often incremented after major changes have been made to the software.
• The second number (0) then refers to a minor version within this major
version.
• The third number (7) commonly refers to a specific build number within
the minor version, and is often more meaningful to a developer than end
users.
• The fourth number (1) could then refer to a revision of this build.
Table 4.2 shows a list of some common version numbering schemes used by
software developers.
Clearly there are very many different formats which might occur in either
PRADS or the vulnerabilityinfo database, and in turn must be understood
by the prototype. A large portion of these formats are common numerical
formats used on Linux systems and in general applications, and the named
versions generally used for Microsoft Windows. The nature of the sequential
numeric representations makes it easy to compare all of these with little ef-




9.0.7.1 A simple and commonly used formatting
9.0.7b2 The letter b and number 2 could mean that this is a
beta with some bug fixes
9.0.7rc1 rc1 usually means release candidate 1
9.0.7r2 r2 often means that this is a commercial release with
some improvements
9.0 7.1 Another way to separate the version numbers
Vista Naming used as a version identifier, refers to Win-
dows Vista. Also has a version and build identified
as 6.0.6002, though this number is shared with Win-
dows Server 2008
Vista SP2 Naming used as a version identifier, with a second
portion defining a minor version
Office 2010 Naming and year used as an version identifier
2.5.10/build 69 A version number providing a clear meaning of the
last digits
2012.05.13 A date used as a version number
Table 4.2: Examples of various software versioning schemes
comparisons are basic methods frequently used in several applications, CPAN
provided several modules with sufficient functionality.
The Perl module named Sort::Versions was installed using the command
cpan -i Sort::Versions.pm. Thismodule allows comparison of version num-
bers delimited by periods . and hyphens - , including versions containing
alphabetical characters. Other characters and special signs may however have
unpredictable results as they are compared used ASCII ordering, meaning that
the binary representation of ASCII code characters are used.
Generally when comparing a version found in a PRADS fingerprint with a
version found in the vulnerabilityinfo table, the versions will be on the same
format. Due to this, the Sort::Versions module becomes even more pow-
erful, and will allow comparison of version names where the same character
sequence or string occurs in both versions. This is the case in Windows service
packs, which can be represented as SP1, SP2 and so forth.
This methodwill however not be able to handle version names where the char-
acter sequence holds special meanings, such as in the Windows versions “XP”
and “Vista”. To handle these cases, one possibility, and also the method im-
plemented was to define a static indexed array in Perl, storing every known
Windows version name in ascending order. That waywewould have a lookup
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table and could simply compare the array indexes. Theminimal example show
in code 4.12 would return 6 when executed with XP, while Vistawould return
10. That way we know that Vista is greater than XP.
1 my @windows = qw {95 NT4.0 98 98SE 2000 Me XP XP -64 2003 XP -Pro
Vista 2008 7};
2 my %index;
3 @index{@windows } = (0..$# windows );
4
5 my $find = <STDIN >;
6 chomp $find;
7 my $index = $index{$find};
8 print "$find is windows version $index\n";
Code 4.12: Perl indexed array example
Despite Windows operating systems being marketed and associated with var-
ious version names, each release still retains an internal version number re-
ferring to the kernel version and build on release. Windows XP for example
has the version number 5.1.2600, while Windows 7 has the version number
6.1.7601. Since the indexed array implementation for version comparison re-
quires that the program is updated on new releases, an alternative solution
was considered.
Rather than specifying operating system version names in the fingerprint files
and vulnerabilityinfo table, these names could be changed to hold the numeric
version discussed above. That way whole strings such as 6.1.7601 SP1 could
be compared with 6.1.7601 SP2 or 6.0.6002 SP1 and still report correct re-
sults using the earlier mentioned Perl module.
The reason this method was not implemented is because it caused problems
in a few special cases. Some Windows operating systems such as Windows
Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 share the same kernel version. Generally this
is not a concern, due to the major similarities between these versions, but it
still may occur that a vulnerability is only found in one the two systems. It
would also require yet another modification to the PRADS fingerprint files.
4.2.4 Databases
Three new tables storing necessary information to the prototype were added
to the MySQL database. Their relationships with the already present default
Snort tables are described in figure 4.1. The figure is simplified in that it only
shows the fields and tables relevant to the new features provided by the proto-
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type. At the core of the system is the event table, which togetherwith the other
Snort tables define unique alerts. Snort tables omitted from the figure include
references to online signature information, datagram payloads and header in-
formation for ICMP packets. The reasons for not handling ICMP alerts are










































Figure 4.1: A simplified EER diagram for the system’s databases and tables.
The prads table is linked to a Snort event’s IP address in event and a port
number found in either a TCP (tcphdr) or UDP (udphdr) header, depending
on the protocol used. Each unique signature also has a corresponding entry in
the vulnerabilityinfo table.
The prototype, when executed, inserts a new entry into the validation table
for each unique Snort alert. The contents of this validation table are the end
results of the prototype, and defines whether an alert could be ignored or if it




Network Address Translation has been an extremely important aspect of this
project, imposing limitations in the amount of host information available in
PRADS. As briefly described in section 2.3, NAT allows several machines to
share a single IP address by rewriting package headers at a gateway. Figure 4.2
illustrates how a NAT-ed part of the network might affect the alert validation
system. To correctly identify a host in such environments, the prototype uses
an IP address, port number and the protocol type to uniquely define a host.
With the network in figure 4.2 as an example, the prototype would report that
the host at the IP used by the Ubuntu desktop gateway is either of the 3 Linux
versions or Windows 7. Expanding this to a larger NAT environment with a
greater variety of operating systems, it is clear that the prototype would even-
tually, as more traffic is analyzed, treat the IP address as if it could be virtually
any operating system. This means that the prototype would eventually be un-
able to make any decisions, as any alert would be assumed to be valid.
By using the IP, port and protocol however, the prototypewould often severely
decrease the amount of information about a host, in exchange for much greater
precision. By no longer using the IP address alone as identification, the system
may even lose all information it previously had available about a target, if that
specific port and protocol combination has yet to trigger a PRADS signature.
On the other hand, we will get an opposite effect when the NAT-ed network
grows larger and more diverse over a period of time while using the stricter
host identification. As more time passes, the prototypewill be better equipped
to make decisions as the chance of triggering PRADS signatures grows. For
these reasons, the stricter host definitions were used in the prototype. Fur-
thermore, this means that the system becomes more dependent on having a
reasonably good set of signatures, to be able to identify operating systems at
comparable speed as before. Although these scenarios were concerned with
operative system detection, the same ideas apply to service detection as well.
IP masquerading
The basic and most common form of NAT is often referred to as masquerading
in for example iptables[18], and allows for outgoing connections from client
applications to be dynamically NAT-ed. This introduces an additional prob-
lem in regards to client applications. Consider a Ubuntu 11.10 host browsing









































A copy of every packet passing through the main
switch is sent to Snort / PRADS and analyzed
Figure 4.2: A network topology where 4 different hosts share an IP address.
traffic triggers a PRADS signature which registers the IP address, port 34567
and the TCP protocol as a Linux kernel 3.0 machine. Later, when the port
34567 is no longer used and has been released, a Windows 7 machine on the
same internal network is assigned the same port and downloads a virus, com-
promising the host. While Snort notices this and produces an alert, PRADS
has no matching signature and still thinks a Linux 3.0 host resides here.
In turn, this would cause the validation program to believe that the alert should
be ignored, since the executable file in question does not affect Linux. To deal
with such special cases, a timer was introduced to the prototype, which should
be set as high as possible, but no higher than the timer used for determining
when a socket can be re-used in the NAT device. Alternatively set higher, at a
somewhat low risk of real alerts being ignored.
When the prototype looks for host entries in the PRADS database, entries with
port numbers above 1023 will be ignored if they are older than the timer per-
mits. This way, we can be reasonably sure that the problem described above
will not occur. Port numbers above 1023 were chosen because the operating
system generally does not assign the first 1023 ports to clients programs. Ports
below this threshold are used by processes that provide services, and should
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be NAT-ed with static rules to be accessible.
Allowing aging host information to become outdated will also help with con-
fusion imposed by DHCP (described in section 2.4). Dynamic IP addresses are
usually assigned hosts that are not providing services, so the problems caused
by DHCP can be alleviated using the same timer solution as for IP masquerad-
ing. The aging feature will necessarily reduce the amount of available host
information at the benefit of ensuring correctness. This means that it will be
even more important that signatures are frequently triggered, to replace any
outdated information.
With a larger number of machines behind a NAT-ed network, one can expect
the same sockets to be re-used more often. Similarly, with more hosts drawing
dynamic IP addresses from an IP range the same IP address can be assumed
to be re-used more frequently.
4.2.6 Categorizing alerts
The original plan for the prototype was to simply assign a value to each alert,
stating whether it was likely to be a true or false positive. As the system de-
veloped however, the fact that alerts cannot always be easily lumped into two
categories was recognized.
A simple scoring algorithm was implemented in the prototype based on how
sure the program can be that an alert is a true or false positive. The criteria for
determining an alerts validity are based on whether the OS, service and ver-
sions in the host information table and vulnerability information table match.
• Alerts that are valid against any target (OS, Service and their versions)
are assigned a lower score, since such attacks are generally less prone to
succeed. SSH brute force attacks would be one example.
• Alerts that are valid against specific targets are assigned a higher score,
since they are more prone to have succeeded. A buffer overflow attack
exploiting a bug in a specific software version is one such example.
• As targets become more specific, score is increased, while the score will
be lower as they become more ambiguous.
• If another OS or service is detected on that IP, port and protocol number
than what the vulnerability info defined as applicable, score is greatly
reduced
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• If no information is available, the score remains unchanged, since the
prototype does not know what to make of the alert
Finally the priority assigned to an alert by Snort is used as a weight to produce
a final score. This score can then help a busy system administrator determine
which alerts should be investigated first. Alerts with very low scoresmay even
be ignored entirely.
4.2.7 Problematic protocols
Since IP addresses are defined at the transport layer of the Internet protocol
suite, lower level protocols cannot be handled by the prototype implementa-
tion. This minor limitation means that fingerprints made by PRADS on for
example the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) cannot be used, and
alerts on the ICMP protocol in Snort cannot be validated.
4.3 Prototype program flow
Figure 4.3 illustrates how the prototype works through a simplified program
flow chart. The validateAlert subroutine is shown in light blue on the right
side. See appendix A for the complete source code for the prototype.
4.4 Testing
To determine the viability of the proof of concept introduced in this project,
it was necessary to produce some Snort alerts for testing purposes. Real net-
work traffic in a part of an unfiltered network on the HiOA was logged to a
file through the tcpdump command. Due to the high network load, it was nec-
essary to increase the capture buffer, though even when set to the maximum
value a few packets were still dropped.
Over the course of 5 days, roughly 60 GB of network traffic was logged to a
PCAP format file. 104960682 packets were logged while 1385 packets were
dropped by the kernel due to higher traffic load than the server could handle.
The commands used to collect and analyze the network traffic with Snort and




































Figure 4.3: A simple program flow chart for the prototype.
1 tcpdump -n -s 0 -B 1048576 -i eth1 -w /root /tcpdump.pcap
2 snort -r tcpdump .pcap
3 barnyard2 -d /var/log/snort -f snort.u2 -w /var/log/snort/
barnyard2 .waldo
4 prads -r tcpdump .pcap -l /var/log/snort/prads -assets.log
5 ./ prads2db --file /var/log/snort/prads -assets.log
Code 4.13: Generating Snort alerts
Three new Snort rules were added to the Snort rule set for testing purposes.
These were made to simulate detection of attacks against two specific web-
servers, the Apache HTTP server and Internet Information Services 7.5 (IIS).
The first rule defined an exploit attempt of an Apache server earlier than ver-
sion 2.2.22 on any operating system. The second rule was valid against IIS
7.5 on Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7. Finally the third rule would
trigger on attacks against Apache version earlier than 2.2.22 on Linux kernels
earlier than 3.0.
This approach allowed the prototype and the system surrounding it (PRADS
and Snort), to see a great variety of alerts and hosts. In turn, this made it
possible to observe how the prototype behaved in a variety of situations. It
was expected that the effectiveness of the prototype’s decisions would depend
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heavily on the information available on a per-alert basis.




The results from testing the prototype implementation are displayed and also explained
to some extent in this chapter.
5.1 General testbed overview
The Snort alerts generated by analyzing the tcpdump log file are displayed in
table 5.1. The alerts with signature IDs (SID) 9876500, 9876501 and 9876502
were triggered by custom signatures made purely for testing purposes. These
three signatures did not correspond to real attacks, but where triggered using
a special TCP payload as defined within these Snort rules.
Signature SID Times seen
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 17317 29
Download of executable content - x-header 16313 5
Download of executable content 11192 9
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 9876501 27
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 testrule 9876500 6
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0
testrule
9876502 10
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port
denial of service attempt
11263 26
Table 5.1: The Snort rules triggered while testing the prototype
The corresponding vulnerabilityinfo table entries defining the applicable
targets of these alerts are shown in table 5.2.
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SID Operating system Service




9876500 0 apache:< 2.2.22
9876502 Linux:< 3.0 apache:< 2.2.22
11263 0 apache:< 2.0.55
Table 5.2: Vulnerability definitions for the Snort rules
After analyzing the network traffic, PRADS had stored 15683 entries about
assets it had detected on 4323 different IP address. Of these, 211 IP addresses
resided within the 128.39.73.0/24 subnet.
5.2 Prototype results
5.2.1 Alerts with undetermined statuses
16 out of the 112 alerts processed by the prototype did not have a correspond-
ing host entry on the exact IP, port and protocol combination used to trigger
the Snort alert. This meant that the prototype was unable to validate these
alerts. These 16 alerts were generated by traffic originating at 15 IP addresses
on the 128.39.73.0/24 network. 13 of these were assigned to student virtual
machine networks, consisting of a Linux with NAT and one Windows 7 ma-
chine using the Linux machine as a gateway. The fact that the prototype was
unable to find host information related to these hosts shows that the solution
implemented to handle NAT is limiting the the results.
PRADS did however have several entries for these 13 virtualized networks,
which showed that the following operating systems might be present: Win-
dows 2000 SP2+, Windows XP SP1+, Windows 98, Linux kernel 2.6, Linux
kernel 2.4. The 3 other IP addresses also had a variety of operating systems,
includingWindows 98 SE,Windows XP,Windows 2000, Windows 7, Windows
2008 R2 and FreeBSD 4.8. This confirms that the NAT solution was necessary,
at the very least in this heavily virtualized network.
The source of the problem is that 14 of the these unvalidated alerts referred
to clients downloading executable Windows files (.exe) through HTTP. When
browsing through different websites, new TCP connections are established at
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a high pace, depending on the sites and if solutions like persistent HTTP are
used. This means that the executable downloads mentioned above could have
been done through a very limited number of packet exchanges, leaving very
few chances for PRADS to fingerprint the machine on that exact port.
Having a larger set of well written signatures will presumably help alleviat-
ing this problem, similarly to how it would help with the host information
aging mentioned in subsection 4.2.5 IP masquerading. Ideally PRADS would
be able to quickly produce a fingerprint for every port used.
5.2.2 Alerts with determined statues
The remaining 96 alerts had entries in both the host and the vulnerability in-
formation databases. There was much variation in howmuch information was
available for these 96 alerts. The summary below showswhat information was
available to how many alerts.
 For 25 of the alerts the prototypewas unable to determine if there was an
operating system match, because their host entries did not contain any
operating system information.
 8 of the alerts had an exact match on the operating system used and the
vulnerable system defined in the vulnerability information database.
– All of these alerts had an exact match on the operating system ver-
sion as well.
 4 alerts had an operating system and version mismatch between the host
and vulnerability information databases. This means that another oper-
ating system was detected than what the attack was aimed at, hence it
was very unlikely that the target was vulnerable.
 59 alerts were defined as valid against “any possible operating system”.
 For 8 of the alerts the prototype was unable to determine if there was
a service match, because their host entries did not contain any service
information.
 8 of the alerts where service entries were present did not have a service
version listed
 80 of the alerts had a service match
– 36 of these alerts had a service version match, while another 36 had
a service version mismatch.
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 8 alerts had a service mismatch. This means that another service was
detected than what the attack was aimed at, hence it was very unlikely
that the target was vulnerable.
 None of these 96 alerts were defined as valid against “any possible ser-
vice”, however 16 alerts were valid against any version of the service
they were targeted at.
5.2.3 Investigating the prototype decisions
After the prototype had been applied to the Snort alerts, each of the 112 alerts
had received a score in the range 100 to -200. A higher score implies that the
alert is more relevant, while a negative score implies that the alert is irrelevant
and may be ignored. Alerts where the prototype was unable to make a deci-
sion, in this case the 16 alerts discussed in subsection 5.2.1, had their scores set
to 0. Refer to appendix B for a complete overview of the scores assigned to the
Snort alerts.
An excerpt of the unique alerts and scores assigned by the prototype is shown
in table 5.3. The alerts with the highest scores are the ones where all the crite-
ria for the attack have been met, while the lowest scores are assigned to alerts
where none of the criteria are met, and instead conflicting operating systems
and services are detected. This is the case when an exploit is targeting Win-
dows machine with IIS 7.5, but the host is Linux running Apache 2.
Table 5.3: Excerpt of the prototype results
Signature Priority IP Port Score
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2150058472 80 100
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2150058474 80 100
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 testrule 1 2150058474 80 80
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058289 22 80
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2150058471 80 60
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058413 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058419 443 10
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058494 443 0
Download of executable content 1 2150058290 55810 0
Download of executable content - x-header 1 2150058320 60028 0
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058281 22 -10
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2688863725 80 -120
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2150058474 80 -200
By running the prototype in debugging mode, it was possible to see exactly
how the prototype determined what score to assign to each alert. Code listing
5.1 shows the debugmode output for the three IIS 7.5 alerts. In the first alert all
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of the host properties can be seen to match the vulnerability definitions. The
number 15 is the internal reference to Windows 2008 R2 used for Windows
version comparison. A score is then assigned based on the the discoveries,
and is then weighted based on the rule priority defined in Snort.
In the second alert, the prototype is able to determine that the server is run-
ning an applicable service, but has no information about the operating system.
In this special scenario, it would be possible for a human to deduce that the
operating system is either Windows 7 or Windows 2008 R2, since IIS 7.5 is
only available to these two operating systems. Unfortunately the prototype
implementation is not intelligent enough to determine this fact.
Finally the third alert is given the very low score of -200 because the server
is running Linux and Apache, which means that we can sure that it does not
run Windows and IIS. If we simply had no host information was available, we
could not have been sure whether the alert was valid or not.
1 DEBUG: ’windows ’ matches ’Windows ’
2 DEBUG: Versions 15 and 15 are equal
3 DEBUG: ’Microsoft -IIS ’ matches ’Microsoft -IIS ’
4 DEBUG: Versions 7.5 and 7.5 are equal
5 DEBUG: Score calculator got these: [1] [1] [1] [1]
6 DEBUG: Alert priority : 1
7 DEBUG: ’128.39.73.232:80 ’ with sig ’EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5
testrule ’ (cid: 1080, prio : 1) got the score 100
8
9 DEBUG: ’Microsoft -IIS ’ matches ’Microsoft -IIS ’
10 DEBUG: Versions 7.5 and 7.5 are equal
11 DEBUG: Score calculator got these: [0] [0] [1] [1]
12 DEBUG: Alert priority : 1
13 DEBUG: ’160.68.205.237:80 ’ with sig ’EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5
testrule ’ (cid: 788, prio : 1) got the score 60
14
15 DEBUG: We were looking for windows , but the OS is actually Linux
16 DEBUG: We were looking for Microsoft -IIS , but the service is
actually Apache
17 DEBUG: Score calculator got these: [-1] [-1] [-1] [-1]
18 DEBUG: Alert priority : 1
19 DEBUG: ’128.39.73.234:80 ’ with sig ’EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5
testrule ’ (cid: 778, prio : 1) got the score -200
Code 5.1: Running the prototype in debugging mode
From table 5.3 it can be seen that an OpenSSH alert was given the rather high
score of 80. This alert was generated from real network traffic triggering a
real Snort alert. The applicable target for this alert is OpenSSH versions be-
low 4.4, while the target was actually running version 3.8.1p1. Since this
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alert matches any operating system, the prototype will not give the alert a full
100 score despite being relatively likely to have succeeded. Other OpenSSH
alerts were given a much lower score, -10, because these were running ver-
sions above 4.4. These alerts were quite unlikely to have succeeded, so it may
have been appropriate to assign an even lower score. The scores assigned are
easily adjustable according to the systemadministrator’s preferences however.
The DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port denial of ser
vice attempt alerts were real attacks from IP addresses based in Shanghai,
China. Since the only information the prototype was able to confirm was that
the attack was using TLS, while in other cases no information was available
besides the fact that the attack was valid against any operating system, these
alerts were given quite low scores.
Finally, the executable file download alerts were completely ignored by the




In this chapter the approach to answering the research questions, the test results and
the design are discussed. Future additions to the prototype research in the field is also
suggested.
The process of planning, designing and implementing a working prototype
has required solutions to several important problems to be found. Designing
the system while creating as few limitations as possible has required much
planning and many choices had to be done. One of the earliest problems that
had to be dealt with was to find the most appropriate way to gather the neces-
sary network information to provide host awareness to the prototype. A signa-
ture based passive fingerprinting solution was implemented through PRADS,
which was a quite different approach to what has previously been done in
similar systems. As a part of the passive fingerprinting solution, NAT also
had to be handled in a way that produced correct results without limiting the
available host information more than necessary.
A significant amount of time was spent on an attempt to find a way to au-
tomatically gather all of the available vulnerability information from external
Internet sources. This proved excessively problematic due to issues such as
vulnerability descriptions being written in arbitrary ways meant to be read by
humans. This problem was eventually left unsolved in favor of implementing
the prototype to a level where it could be tested. This was considered to be a
higher priority because unlike automatically gathering vulnerability informa-
tion, testing the prototype was vital to answering the problem statements.
Another major problem was to help the prototype understand the data it was
provided with, so that the information could be compared and a decision be
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made. Parts of the PRADS fingerprints had verbose information presumably
designed to be human readable. Eventually slight modifications were made
to the PRADS fingerprints to allow easier information extraction in the proto-
type.
In general, reports of previous work was lacking detailed information on se-
lected interesting topics such as how external vulnerability information was
parsed and made readable by their implementations. Having more infor-
mation on their solutions to such problems would mean that these problems
could be solved more quickly in this project, allowing time to be spent more
efficiently. Furthermore, the commercial solutions that claimed to have simi-
lar features had very limited information available on the internal mechanics
dealing with network and context awareness. Furthermore, Sourcefire for ex-
ample required registration and signing up for newsletters to gain access to
white papers.
Snort was configured to a minimal level that one might expect from a real
world system where only limited information about the network was avail-
able. Rules that were producing excessive amounts of general informational
alerts were removed. The only possible validation the planned prototypewould
be able to perform on alerts such as for example SSH brute force attacks would
be to check if the target was using the default port 22. This type of alert filter-
ing is already easily done by configuring the network’s SSH ports in Snort. In
retrospect, it could have been interesting to see how well the prototype had
performed in comparison to a completely un-configured IDS, and also in dif-
ferent networks.
6.1 Discussion on the test results
6.1.1 Possible error sources
The signatures used for service detection in PRADS rely on matching regu-
lar expression patterns with known text strings reported by the servers. This
means that we have to trust these servers to report correct information about
their services. Often these text strings are easily modified in the service’s con-
figuration files. Usually these are only modified for security reasons, where
one might not want the service version and patch levels to be publicly avail-
able. These strings could just as easily be changed by a mischievous service
operator to report incorrect information. As an example, an Apache 2 HTTP
server could be configured to report that it is in fact an OpenSSH server. This
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means that there was a chance that the final scores in some of the alerts with
service definitions would be incorrectly assigned. Through manual inspection
of these alerts, it was shown that no such cases existed in the test data. It was
not possible to determine if the service versions reported by some of the ser-
vices had been tampered with however. In contrast to the regular expression
patternmatching, the PRADS operating system signatures and a portion of the
signatures used in Snort analyze the characteristics of the datagram as well as
binary or hexadecimal content. This makes it much more difficult to tamper
with the information.
Using tcpdump and logging data for almost a week before analyzing it with
Snort and PRADS can be assumed to have affected the test results. When test-
ing the prototype PRADS would have host entries dating back several days
which could then be applied even to the first alerts generated. If the testing
was done on live network traffic and the validation was done continuously as
new alerts were generated, the results may have been worse, depending on
how quickly PRADS would detect the relevant assets. Despite this, using tcp-
dump was justified by the fact that it allowed experiments to be redone with-
out having to spend several days on collecting new data had something gone
wrong. The tcpdump approach used here may be compared to a systemwhere
testing only began after the system had been running for a few days. Dynamic
IPs did not cause errors, as the 128.39.73.0/24 network did not use DHCP.
Furthermore the “test rule” alerts showing attacks against targets outside the
local network were created near the end of the packet logging session. In ret-
rospect it could have been interesting to compare the results of tests where the
system started from scratch with no host information with results where the
system has been running for a while to get a decent network overview.
The testing was done in a real environment using real network traffic. A por-
tion of the alerts were made from custom made signatures with the sole pur-
pose of generating a variety of alerts. The results are reproduceable in that all
the steps necessary to set up a similar environment, and the source code for
the prototype is provided. Additionally all tools used throughout the project
were free and open source. Despite the large amount of network traffic in-
spected, relatively few alerts were produced by the IDS. This is likely because
basic configuration was done to eliminate general informational alerts such as
warnings about SSH brute force attempts. Furthermore, the HiOA network
blocked incoming traffic on a few common ports used by remote desktop ser-
vices such as VNC and RDP.
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6.1.2 Expectations
It was expected that the prototype would be able to determine the validity of
a portion of the Snort alerts, and that the available host information for each
target would be the limiting factor in the decisions. The results of the testing
show that almost all of the alerts were assigned an appropriate score. The top
scores of 80 to 100 were all assigned to alerts that could be assumed to have
been completely valid, since all of the available requirements were met. The
alerts with score 60 all had a match on the service and service version, but
the prototype was unable to confirm the operating system due to lack of host
information.
Of the 29 OpenSSH attacks, only one OpenSSH server was determined to be
vulnerable due to a service version match. The remaining 28 attacks were
assigned scores below the default score of 0. A few alerts with extremely low
chances of success were given scores as low as -120 and -200.
The DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port denial of ser
vice attempt rules were at times assigned slightly higher scores than desired.
The only fact that the prototypewas able to confirm on these alerts was that the
traffic was using SSL/TLS encryption. In reality this specific denial of service
attack also required Apache versions 2.0 to 2.0.55 to be installed and config-
ured in a very specific way. The prototype knows nothing of the files on the
target system however so these scores were to be expected.
Overall the results show that the prototype was very effective in categorizing
the alerts with appropriate scores.
6.1.3 Comparison to related work
The end results of a prototype such as the one implemented in this project will
depend heavily on the network on which it is tested. This makes it difficult
to compare the results with reports of similar implementations. A network
consisting entirely of serverswhere all services are known to the fingerprinting
system would for example give a completely different result than a network
with many unknowns or several possible configurations detected. Similarly
the type and number of alerts would also have a large impact, since it is usually
much easier to determine the success of a targeted attack than a general attack.
In the related work discussed in section 2.5, several different numbers indicat-
ing how many false positives or even false negatives were removed by their
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systems are reported, however in general they are not directly comparable.
Furthermore the prototype implemented in this report does not simply cate-
gorize alerts as false or true positives. By looking at the number of alerts that
were assigned a score, it is clear that a large number of alerts were categorized
with the help of the prototype. The end result of both the prototype introduced
in this report and the related work were similar in that all of the systems were
able to categorize the alerts to some extent based on the available information.
6.2 The resulting prototype
The prototype implemented in this project can be seen as a more realistic im-
plementation than some of the public research done in earlier years. Most of
the previous approaches have either had terrible scalability due to using ac-
tive scanning techniques, which in turn limited their alert validations to a few
ports on the target machines, unrealistically assumed authenticated access to
each of the hosts on the system, or assumed that each host has all their relevant
configurations defined in a database. The prototype introduced in this project
does not have these problems or assumptions.
None of these earlier approaches have mentioned taking into consideration
important networking technologies such as NAT and dynamic IP addresses
through DHCP. This means that their solutions are prone to making errors in
virtualized networks, or rapidly changing networks where hosts are leaving
and joining the network. The prototype implemented here was designed with
both of these networking technologies in mind. Being able to handle NAT has
been extremely important for many years now due to the popularity of virtual-
ization. Furthermore, being able to handle dynamic IP addresses is important
if one wants to have an IDS in a networkwhere for example people bring their
own mobile devices, which is also becoming increasingly common.
Stealthiness, meaning it’s harder for an intruder to detect and know about the
system is also a key benefit of using passive fingerprinting, and compliments
an IDS with mirrored traffic very well. For an attacker, this could mean that he
does not knowwhich IDS evasion method he should use, or if any IDS is even
present at all.
Another major difference between the prototype developed in this project and
previous similar implementations is that this prototype assigns scores rather
than simply using two predefined categories. These scores relate to a degree
of likeliness that an attack was successful as well as the severity of the attack.
In a busy system where the administrator only has time to investigate a small
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subset of the alerts, it is extremely helpful knowing which alerts were most
likely to have succeeded, and also which alerts had too many unknowns to be
categorized.
One side effect of the current prototype implementation is that it might hide
outgoing attacks from the network if the alerts from these were considered to
be unsuccessful by the system. System administrators would probably like to
know about attacks done from the network they are responsible for. A sim-
ple solution to this could be to configure PRADS to only log host information
for the network it resides in, at the expense of not being able to determine if
outgoing attacks could have been successful. On the other hand, knowing if
an outgoing attack was successful may not be as relevant to the system ad-
ministrator. Systems without active or passive fingerprinting do not have to
consider this issue, since they are unable to gather host information about out-
side sources. It should also be noted that active scanning of hosts outside the
local network may have legal implications.
6.3 Future work
6.3.1 Future work in this topic
The definitions in the existing vulnerability information databases are either
meant to be human readable and therefore extremely difficult to interpret au-
tomatically at times, or have a somewhat strict but verbose format which is
only accessible by downloading individual HTML pages. A publicly avail-
able, downloadable database with vulnerability definitions following a strict
format needs to be developed for usage in this and other network security
systems.
PRADS fingerprints should be extended with additional signatures with ma-
chine readability in mind. A strict format for defining version ranges and mul-
tiple possibilities should be required rather than the currently existing ques-
tion marks, comments and other information meant to be human readable.
For the most part the signatures used in PRADS appear to stem from old p0f
or PADS signatures. Considering the relatively small communities surround-
ing these projects and probably limited usage as parts of other systems, it is
understandable that stricter formatting has not been prioritized earlier. Fur-
thermore, it may be beneficial if service signatures based on binary and hex-
adecimal payloads were introduced in PRADS. That way the system cannot be
tricked as easily by mischievous administrators.
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The host and vulnerability information gathered by such systems could pro-
vide useful information to IDS front ends such as BASE. Having all the related
information in one place would be convenient for investigating the alerts man-
ually.
Sourcefire 3D supposedly provides real-time user awareness through a mod-
ule, which is able to link IP addresses to active directory and LDAP users.
This means that the system administrator does not have to find this informa-
tion manually. Such a feature could also be added to the prototype imple-
mented here. More importantly however, with the agent solution proposed in
section 6.3.2 an idea worth exploring could be reporting of which system user
was responsible for the offending process in a Snort alert.
6.3.2 Prototype improvements
Since the main goal of the prototype developed in this project was to pro-
vide answers to the research questions rather than implementing a production
ready system, some additional features should be implemented for it to be us-
able in a real world solution. Firstly the system does not currently remove
old PRADS data, meaning the database will eventually grow very large. An
intelligent solution for data aging should therefore be implemented. This so-
lution could for example consider the entry’s age, how frequently the asset
has been seen with same configuration and maybe even consider how sane
the configuration on the system appears to be. Having a Linux server with IIS
7.5 would for example be difficult to achieve, while windows machines with
apache HTTP servers are relatively rare in comparison to IIS.
Better support for various combinations of meta characters such as <,>,>=
,<=,+,−, for version numbers would be convenient for both host and vul-
nerability definitions. This way version number ranges could be defined. This
was not considered a high priority in the prototype since the alerts did not re-
quire them. A real implementation would require significant testing on all the
possible combinations of meta characters.
The solution shown in the prototype should be better integrated into Snort, so
that the solution works in IPS (intrusion prevention) mode as well. This will
require heavy optimization and quite likely an implementation written in C.
The database information used to make decisions should be kept in memory
for quicker access, since reading from a hard drive is much too slow when
running an IDS in inline mode.
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The score calculations and its configuration possibilities could be made much
more feature rich and advanced. Although the testing done in this project
showed that the assigned scores were generally quite correct, the currentmethod
is very simple and could probably benefit from a more complex solution.
The ability to define single IP addresses or subnets that do or do not have NAT
orDHCPwould be useful. That way the prototype couldworkmore efficiently
by making use of all the relevant host information which would otherwise go
to waste.
Agent based solution
Having an agent based solution to compliment the passive fingerprinting sys-
tem for host information gathering was an attractive prospect given much
thought earlier in this project. The idea was later dropped due to the extra
amount of work necessary to handle NAT in such a solution. This feature
was not considered important enough in regards to answering the research
questions to justify the time investment. Nevertheless, the idea was explored
thoroughly and appropriate solution was found albeit not implemented.
On Ubuntu machines which the agent was developed for the ss -tulpn com-
mand, an improvement to the popular netstat command provided all the
necessary process information about services listening for incoming traffic. To-
gether with the dpkg -l command and some regular expressions it was then
possible to extract exact version numbers for several services.
In networks with NAT, it would then be necessary to communicate the infor-
mation to an agent on that machine, which could translate the port numbers
into their correct values as they would be seen from the intrusion detection
system. An example of this setup is shown in figure 6.1. The servers without
NAT communicate their information directly to the IDS machine, while the
machines with local IP addresses have to communicate their information to
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The main goal in this thesis has been to design, implement and test a proto-
type which introduced network and context awareness to an intrusion detec-
tion system (IDS), with the purpose of reducing the number of false alarms
reported. To achieve this goal, three relevant research questions were investi-
gated.
I. In what way can existing open source software tools best be used for
collecting host information relevant to intrusion detection in a network?
Passive fingerprinting was determined to be the best solution for the proto-
type. Key benefits included excellent scalability, stealthiness by not leaving
any network footprints, quick asset detection assuming decent signatures are
used, no authenticated access or control necessary on the hosts and inherent
strengths in handlingmobile devices and dynamic networks. PRADSwas cho-
sen because it appeared to be the most advanced and up to date open source
software tool for passive fingerprinting at the time.
II. How can the collected host information be applied to the alerts pro-
duced by signature based IDS such as Snort?
Host information can be compared to online vulnerability definitions which
are referenced in most Snort rules. Several information sources were consid-
ered, but none were able to provide an API or downloadable database with
machine readable content. As a temporary solution, a small portion of the
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vulnerability definitions were manually added to a local database for testing
purposes. It is hoped that the online sources will be improved in the future.
III. What are the benefits and drawbacks of introducing network aware-
ness in an IDS, effectively making it a target based IDS?
By implementing a prototype it was possible to demonstrate the possibility
and effectiveness of classifying Snort alerts according to their relevance, by
providing the IDS with network awareness. Making host information avail-
able to Snort has helped the IDS on its way towards becoming a “next genera-
tion” IDS. Now that fundamental requirements for a “next generation” system
has been provided, a logical next step could for example be the addition of
user awareness. On the downside, relying on another layer of signature based
decisions meant that a possibility of additional errors was introduced, albeit
rarely.
The final verdict was that the prototype was able to assign appropriate scores
to Snort alerts generated from real network traffic, based on the information it
had available on each individual incident.
7.2 Additional contributions to the field
There has been significant research in anomaly based IDS compared to sig-
nature based IDS for many years. This does not reflect the real world where
signature based systems completely dominate the field. This report adds to the
signature based IDS research field with new insight into network and context
awareness.
Problems caused by Network Address Translation and DHCP which have
been entirely ignored in previous work were discussed and solved. The proto-
type was designed with these two technologies in mind throughout the whole
process. This means that the solution can be applied to virtualized networks
and environments with mobile devices, both of which are becoming increas-
ingly popular.
Previous similar work has been largely focused on providing IDS network
awareness though active scanning, configuration databases or agent based so-
lutions. Furthermore, much of the previous work has been focused on HTTP
traffic. In contrast, the prototype developed here allows for passive detection
of operating systems as well as services and their versions by comparing TCP
and UDP packets to known signatures.
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1 #!/usr /bin /perl -w
2
3 # ./ validator .pl -h
4 # version 1.0
5
6 # Required packages
7 use Getopt ::Std;
8 use strict "vars";
9 use DBI ;
10 use Socket ; # Used for IP address conversion
11 use Sort:: Versions ; # Simple version number comparison ,
12 # http :// search .cpan.org /~ edavis /Sort -Versions -1.5/ Versions .pm
13
14 # Global variables
15 my $VERBOSE = 0;
16 my $DEBUG = 0;
17
18 # Handle flags and arguments
19 # Example : c == "-c", "c: == "-c argument "
20 my $opt_string = ’vdhS:H:P:D:u:p:’;
21 getopts ( "$opt_string ",\my %opt ) or usage () and exit 1;
22
23 # Note: The DBI module cannot execute queries over multiple databases ,
24 # tables that must be joined for example should reside within the same db.
25
26 # Default variable values
27 my $snortserver = "mysql ";
28 my $snorthost = "localhost ";
29 my $snortport = "3306";
30 my $snortdb = "snort ";
31 my $snortuser = "snort ";
32 my $snortpw = "";
33
34 my $hostinfoserver = "mysql ";
35 my $hostinfohost = "localhost ";
36 my $hostinfoport = "3306";
37 my $hostinfodb = "prads ";
38 my $hostinfouser = "prads";
39 my $hostinfopw = "";
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40
41 my $siginfoserver = "mysql ";
42 my $siginfohost = "localhost ";
43 my $siginfoport = "3306";
44 my $siginfodb = "snort ";
45 my $siginfouser = "snort ";
46 my $siginfopw = "";
47
48 my $validationserver = "mysql ";
49 my $validationhost = "localhost ";
50 my $validationport = "3306";
51 my $validationdb = "snort";
52 my $validationuser = "snort ";
53 my $validationpw = "";
54
55 # Time in seconds before entries with port > 1023 are outdated in PRADS
56 my $nat_lifespan = 300;
57
58 # Scores for the alert ’categorizing’
59 # note: if a conflicting OS/service is detected , a negative score * 2 is used
60 # note: if any target is applicable , half score is used
61 my @score = (
62 20, # The operating systems match
63 20, # The operating system versions match
64 30, # The services match
65 30, # The service versions match
66 );
67
68 # Print help message if -h is invoked





74 # Handle other user input
75 $VERBOSE = 1 if $opt{’v’};
76 $DEBUG = 1 if $opt{’d’};
77
78 ##### Main script content
79 #
80 verbose ("Verbose is enabled \n");
81 debug("Debug is enabled \n");
82
83 # Hardcoded indexed array for known named version comparison , starting at win 95
84 my @windows = ("95", "NT4 .0", "98", "98SE", "2000", "Me", "XP", "XP64", "2003", "XPPro64 ",
"WinFLP ", "Vista ", "HomeServer ", "2008", "7", "2008 R2", " HomeServer2011", "8");
85 my %index ;
86 @index {@windows } = (0..$# windows );
87
88 my $counter = 0;
89 verbose ("#### VALIDATING ####\ n\n");
90
91 getAlerts ();
92 verbose ("validated $counter alerts \n");
93
94 # Fetches all the alerts which have not yet been validated against the host information
95 sub getAlerts {
96 my $snortdsn = "dbi :$snortserver:$snortdb :$snorthost :$snortport ";
97 my $snortdbh = DBI ->connect ($snortdsn , $snortuser , $snortpw ) or die "Error: Could not
connect to the Snort database :\n" . $DBI:: errstr . "\n";
67
98
99 # Get all the alerts that have not yet been validated
100 # Think the acid_event table might actually belong to BASE? If so should probably use
a more complex query to join the various SNORT tables to get the same result
101 my $query = "SELECT sig_name , sig_sid , sig_priority , ip_dst , tcp_dport , udp_dport ,
event .sid , event .cid FROM event \
102 LEFT JOIN iphdr ON (event .sid = iphdr .sid AND event .cid = iphdr .cid ) \
103 LEFT JOIN tcphdr ON (event.sid = tcphdr .sid AND event .cid = tcphdr .cid ) \
104 LEFT JOIN udphdr ON (event.sid = udphdr .sid AND event .cid = udphdr .cid ) \
105 LEFT JOIN signature ON (event.signature = signature .sig_id ) \
106 LEFT JOIN validation ON (event .cid = validation .cid ) \
107 WHERE validation .status is null";
108
109 my $result = $snortdbh ->prepare ($query );
110 $result ->execute or die "SQL error : $DBI ::errstr \n";
111





117 # Done , disconnect from the database
118 $snortdbh ->disconnect or warn $snortdbh ->errstr ;
119 }
120
121 # Validates an alert against the information collected for a given host
122 sub validateAlert {
123 my $proto = 0;
124 my $dport = 0;
125 if ($_ [4]) {
126 # TCP
127 $dport = $_ [4];
128 $proto = 6;
129 } elsif ($_[5]) {
130 # UDP
131 $dport = $_ [5];
132 $proto = 17;
133 } else {
134 # Some unknown protocol or layer 3 datagram - Likely ICMP
135 updateStatus($_[6], $_[7], 0);




140 my $target = decimalToIp ($_ [3]);
141
142 # Fetch the host information and signature information
143 my @hostinfo = getHostInfo ($target , $dport , $proto );
144 my ($os , $service ) = getSigInfo ($_[1]);
145
146 # No point in trying to compare information unless we have info from both sources
147 if (! @hostinfo ) {
148 updateStatus($_[6], $_[7], 0);
149 return ;
150 }
151 if (($os eq "") && ($service eq "")) {





156 # We have the necessary data , proceed with the comparison
157 my ($os_match , $os_v_match ) = compareOS ($os , @hostinfo );
158 my ($service_match , $service_v_match) = compareService($service , @hostinfo );
159 my $score = categorize ($os_match , $os_v_match , $service_match , $service_v_match , $_
[2]);
160 debug("’$target :$dport ’ with sig ’$_[0]’ (cid : $_[7], prio: $_[2]) got the score
$score \n");
161 updateStatus($_[6], $_[7], $score );
162 }
163
164 # Assigns a score based on the configured weights
165 # Returns the score assigned to the current alert
166 sub categorize () {
167 my $tmp = 0;
168
169 debug("Score calculator got these: ");
170 for (my $i = 0; $i < 4; $i++) {
171 print "[$_[$i]] " if $DEBUG ;
172 if ($_[$i] == 1) {
173 $tmp += $score [$i];
174 } elsif ($_[$i] == -1) {
175 $tmp -= 2 * $score [$i];
176 } elsif ($_[$i] == 2) {
177 $tmp += ($score [$i ]/2);
178 }
179 }
180 print "\n" if $DEBUG ;
181 debug("Alert priority : $_ [4]\n");
182 if ($tmp > 0) {
183 $tmp /= $_[4];
184 } else {






191 # Inserts the final verdict into the database for each alert validated
192 sub updateStatus() {
193 my $validationdsn = "dbi : $validationserver: $validationdb: $validationhost:
$validationport";
194 my $validationdbh = DBI -> connect ($validationdsn , $validationuser , $validationpw) or
die "Error : Could not connect to the validation database :\n" . $DBI :: errstr . "\n"
;
195
196 my $now = time ();
197 my $query = "INSERT INTO validation (sid , cid , status , timestamp ) VALUES ($_[0], $_
[1], $_[2], FROM_UNIXTIME($now)) \
198 ON DUPLICATE KEY UPDATE status =$_[2], timestamp = FROM_UNIXTIME($now)";
199
200 verbose ("Insert query: $query \n");
201 my $result = $validationdbh ->prepare ($query );
202 $result ->execute or die "SQL error : $DBI ::errstr \n";
203 }
204
205 # Compares host operating system with the vulnerability definitions
206 # Returns two flags indicating the result of the OS and version comparison
207 sub compareOS {
208 my ($osstring , @hostinfo ) = @_;
209
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210 # 0 = no match , 1 = match , -1 there is another OS there , 2 = any
211 my $os_match = 0;
212 my $os_v_match = 0;
213
214 if ($osstring eq 0) {
215 # This alert is valid against any OS
216 $os_match = 2;
217 $os_v_match = 2;
218 } else {
219 # Need to investigate further
220
221 # $os format : OS1 :( versions )!OS2 :( versions )
222 my @systems = split (’!’,$osstring );
223
224 # For each OS type , could be one or several , but usually only one .
225 foreach (@systems ) {
226 # First element contains the system , following elements contain versions if
applicable
227 my @system = split (’:’,$_);
228 my $matchedos = $system [0];
229
230 # Check if this OS matches any of several possibly present hostinfo entries
231 foreach (@hostinfo ) {
232 my $entryOS = 0;
233 my @entryversions;
234
235 # The OS name can hold anything except from the meta character ’:’
236 if ($_ =~ /{([^:]+) :?(.*) ?}/) {
237 $entryOS = $1;
238 @entryversions = split (’/’,$2);
239 }
240
241 # Should be exactly same , otherwise ’linux ’ might match a service like ’service -for -
linux ’
242 if (lc($entryOS ) eq lc($matchedos )) {
243 # We have a match on the OS
244 $os_match = 1;
245 debug ("’$matchedos ’ matches ’$entryOS ’\n");
246
247 # Proceed to check all versions if there is any
248 if (scalar (@system ) > 1) {
249 my @versions = split (’/’,$system [1]);
250 # @versions holds the vulnerability DB versions
251 # @entryversions holds the host info DB versions
252
253 foreach my $vdb (@versions ) {
254 foreach my $hdb (@entryversions) {
255 # Decide how to compare versions
256 # Only supports ’1.3.2’, ’<1.2.3’, ’>3.2.1’ at the moment
257
258 # Translating named versions to numeric for comparison
259 if (lc($entryOS ) eq "windows ") {
260 if ( $vdb =~ /[ < >]?([\ S]+) (?:\s[A-Za -z0 -9+ -]+) ?/) {
261 my $replace = $1;
262 my $index = $index {$replace };
263 $vdb =~ s/$replace /$index /;
264 $hdb =~ s/$replace /$index /;
265 } else {





270 # The versioncmp method works just like cmp , but for common version patterns
271 if ($vdb =~ /([<>]) /) {
272 my $meta = $1;
273 if ($meta eq ’<’) {
274 $vdb =~ s/<//;
275 my $res = versioncmp ($vdb , $hdb);
276 if ($res == 1) {
277 $os_v_match = 1;
278 debug ("Version $hdb was smaller than $vdb , version is applicable \n");
279 } elsif (($res == -1) && ($os_v_match == 0)) {
280 $os_v_match = -1;
281 debug ("Version $hdb was greater than $vdb , version not applicable \n");
282 }
283 } elsif ($meta eq ’>’) {
284 $vdb =~ s/>//;
285 my $res = versioncmp ($vdb , $hdb);
286
287 if ($res == -1) {
288 $os_v_match = 1;
289 debug ("Version $hdb was greater than $vdb , version is applicable \n") if (
$res == -1);
290 } elsif (($res == 1) && ($os_v_match == 0)) {
291 $os_v_match = -1;





296 } else {
297 # No meta character , just check if versions equal
298 my $res = versioncmp ($vdb , $hdb);
299 $os_v_match = 1 if ($res == 0);




304 } else {
305 # All OS versions are applicable
306 $os_v_match = 2;
307 }
308 } else {
309 # If the OS entry from PRADS fingerprint has a trailing whitespace , it’s actually
a service entry
310 if (( $entryOS !~ /\s$/) && ($entryOS )) {
311 # If we get there it means that another OS has been detected
312 debug("We were looking for $matchedos , but the OS is actually $entryOS \n");
313 $os_match = -1;






320 return ($os_match , $os_v_match );
321 }
322
323 # Compares host service with the vulnerability definitions
324 # Returns two flags indicating the result of the service and version comparison
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325 sub compareService {
326 my ($servicestring , @hostinfo ) = @_;
327
328 # 0 = no match , 1 = match , -1 = another service detected , 2 = any
329 my $service_match = 0;
330 my $service_v_match = 0;
331
332 if ($servicestring eq 0) {
333 # This alert is valid against any service
334 $service_match = 2;
335 $service_v_match = 2;
336 } else {
337 # Need to investigate further
338
339 # $service format : srv1:vers/ions!srv2:vers/ions
340 my @services = split(’!’,$servicestring);
341
342 # For each service type , could be one or several , but usually only one .
343 foreach (@services ) {
344 # First element contains the service , following elements contain versions if
applicable
345 my @service = split(’:’,$_);
346 my $matchedservice = $service [0];
347
348 # The services have a space after the name in the modified PRADS fingerprints ,
349 # which allows us to distinguish them from OS entries for now
350 # Concatinating a space to $entryservice rather than removing one from
$matchedservice
351 # for later comparison . Optimally PRADS would separate them in the log file
352 $matchedservice .= " ";
353
354 # Check if this service matches any of several possibly present hostinfo entries
355 foreach (@hostinfo ) {
356 my $entryservice = 0;
357 my @entryversions;
358
359 # The service name can hold anything except from the meta character ’:’
360 if ($_ =~ /{([^:]+) :?(.*) ?}/) {
361 $entryservice = $1;
362 @entryversions = split (’/’,$2);
363 }
364
365 # Should be exactly same , otherwise ’ssl ’ might match a service like ’openssl ’ and ’
otherssl ’
366 if (lc($entryservice) eq lc($matchedservice)) {
367 # We have a match on the service
368 $service_match = 1;
369 debug ("’$matchedservice’ matches ’$entryservice ’\n");
370
371 # Proceed to check the all versions if there is any
372 if (scalar (@service ) > 1) {
373 my @versions = split (’/’,$service [1]);
374 # @versions holds the vulnerability DB versions
375 # @entryversions holds the host info DB versions
376 foreach my $vdb (@versions ) {
377 foreach my $hdb (@entryversions) {
378 # Decide how to compare versions
379 # Only supports <1.2.3 and >3.2.1 so far
380
381 # The versioncmp method works just like cmp , but for common version patterns
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382 if ($vdb =~ /([<>]) /) {
383 my $meta = $1;
384 if ($meta eq ’<’) {
385 $vdb =~ s/<//;
386 my $res = versioncmp ($vdb , $hdb);
387 if ($res == 1) {
388 $service_v_match = 1;
389 debug ("Version $hdb was smaller than $vdb , version is applicable \n");
390 } elsif (($res == -1) && ( $service_v_match == 0)) {
391 $service_v_match = -1;
392 debug ("Version $hdb was greater than $vdb , version not applicable \n");
393 }
394 } elsif ($meta eq ’>’) {
395 $vdb =~ s/>//;
396 my $res = versioncmp ($vdb , $hdb);
397 if ($res == -1) {
398 $service_v_match = 1;
399 debug ("Version $hdb was greater than $vdb , version is applicable \n");
400 } elsif (($res == 1) && ($service_v_match == 0)) {
401 $service_v_match = -1;
402 debug ( "Version $hdb was greater than $vdb , version not applicable \n");
403 }
404 }
405 } else {
406 # No meta character , just check if versions equal
407 my $res = versioncmp ($vdb , $hdb);
408 $service_v_match = 1 if ($res == 0);




413 } else {
414 # Any service version is applicable
415 $service_v_match = 2;
416 }
417 } else {
418 if (( $entryservice =~ /\s$/) && ($entryservice)) {
419 # If we get here it means that another service has been detected
420 debug("We were looking for $matchedservice , but the service is actually
$entryservice\n");
421 $service_match = -1;






428 return ($service_match , $service_v_match);
429 }
430
431 # Fetches all relevant host entries for the current alert
432 # Returns the host information as an array
433 sub getHostInfo {
434 my @info;
435 my $hostinfodsn = "dbi :$hostinfoserver:$hostinfodb :$hostinfohost:$hostinfoport";
436 my $hostinfodbh = DBI ->connect ($hostinfodsn , $hostinfouser , $hostinfopw ) or die "Error
: Could not connect to the hostinfo database :\n" . $DBI :: errstr . "\n";
437
438 my $query ;
439 if ($_[1] > 1023) {
73
440 # We expect NAT ports above 1023 to be assigned different hosts and services frequently ,
means PRADS data has to ’age ’ fast
441 my $unixtime = time () - $nat_lifespan;
442 # Get information about the host being targeted in this alert , but only from the last ’
$nat_lifespan’ seconds
443 $query = "SELECT IP , META , FIRST_SEEN , LAST_SEEN FROM $hostinfodb WHERE IP=’$_[0]’ AND
PORT=’$_[1]’ AND PROTO =’$_[2]’ AND LAST_SEEN > ’FROM_UNIXTIME($unixtime )’";
444 } else {
445 # Get information about the host being targeted in this alert
446 $query = "SELECT IP , META , FIRST_SEEN , LAST_SEEN FROM $hostinfodb WHERE IP=’$_[0]’ AND
PORT=’$_[1]’ AND PROTO =’$_[2]’";
447 }
448
449 my $result = $hostinfodbh ->prepare ($query );
450 $result ->execute or die "SQL error : $DBI ::errstr \n";
451
452 while (my @row = $result -> fetchrow_array) {
453 # debug ("HostInfo : $row[0], $row[1], $row[2], $row [3]\n");
454 push(@info , $row [1]);
455 }
456
457 $hostinfodbh ->disconnect or warn $hostinfodbh ->errstr ;
458 return @info ;
459 }
460
461 # Fetches all relevant vulnerability information for the current alert
462 # Returns the vulnerablity definitions
463 sub getSigInfo {
464 my $os = 0;
465 my $service = 0;
466 my $siginfodsn = "dbi : $siginfoserver:$siginfodb :$siginfohost:$siginfoport";
467 my $siginfodbh = DBI -> connect ($siginfodsn , $siginfouser , $siginfopw ) or die "Error :
Could not connect to the signature information database :\n" . $DBI:: errstr . "\n";
468
469 # Get information about the signature with this ID number
470 my $query = "SELECT os , service FROM vulnerabilityinfo WHERE sig_sid =’$_[0]’";
471 my $result = $siginfodbh ->prepare ($query );
472 $result ->execute or die "SQL error : $DBI ::errstr \n";
473
474 # Techically this should only ever return one value , since the ID is a unique primary
key
475 while (my @row = $result -> fetchrow_array) {
476 # debug ("SigInfo : $row[0], $row [1]\n");
477 $os = $row [0];
478 $service = $row [1];
479 }
480
481 $siginfodbh -> disconnect or warn $siginfodbh ->errstr ;
482 return ($os , $service );
483 }
484
485 # Translates a decimal form IP address to the more familiar dotted version
486 # Returns a dotted format IP address string
487 sub decimalToIp {
488 # join ’.’, unpack ’C4 ’, pack ’N’, shift ;







495 sub usage {
496 # prints the correct use of this script
497 print "This script attempts to validate Snort rules based on\n";
498 print "the available host and vulnerability definitions for \n";
499 print "each alert . Database connection information , NAT lifespan \n";
500 print "and score calculation weights may be adjusted according \n";
501 print "to preferences .\n\n";
502
503 print "Usage :\n";
504 print "-h Usage \n";
505 print "-v Verbose \n";
506 print "-d Debug \n";
507
508 print "./ script [-d] [-v] [-h]\n";
509 }
510
511 sub verbose {
512 print "VERBOSE : " . $_[0] if $VERBOSE ;
513 }
514
515 sub debug {
516 print "DEBUG : " . $_[0] if $DEBUG ;
517 }




The sig priority column shown in the table below is the priority assigned by
Snort while the status column contains the score assigned by the prototype.
Table B.1: Prototype results
sig name sig priority ip dst tcp dport status
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2150058472 80 100
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2150058472 80 100
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2150058472 80 100
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2150058474 80 100
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2150058474 80 100
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2150058474 80 100
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2150058474 80 100
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2150058474 80 100
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 testrule 1 2150058474 80 80
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 testrule 1 2150058474 80 80
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 testrule 1 2150058474 80 80
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 testrule 1 2150058474 80 80
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 testrule 1 2150058474 80 80
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 testrule 1 2150058474 80 80
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058289 22 80
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
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Table B.1: Prototype results (continued)
sig name sig priority ip dst tcp dport status
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2150058471 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2688863725 80 60
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058413 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058418 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058418 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058251 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058251 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058420 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058420 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058395 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058468 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058468 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058395 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058487 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058404 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058487 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058404 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058413 443 33
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058419 443 10
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058419 443 10
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058392 443 10
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058392 443 10
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058403 443 10
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058403 443 10
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058410 443 10
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058410 443 10
Download of executable content 1 2150058290 55810 0
Download of executable content 1 2150058379 51795 0
Download of executable content 1 2150058331 51300 0
Download of executable content 1 2150058361 53251 0
Download of executable content 1 2150058327 51331 0
Download of executable content 1 2150058322 53169 0
Download of executable content 1 2150058352 49736 0
Download of executable content 1 2150058317 53011 0
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058470 443 0
Download of executable content - x-header 1 2150058336 57483 0
Download of executable content - x-header 1 2150058324 50062 0
DOS Apache mod ssl non-SSL connection to SSL port 2 2150058494 443 0
Download of executable content - x-header 1 2150058323 59995 0
Download of executable content - x-header 1 2150058322 53178 0
Download of executable content - x-header 1 2150058320 60028 0
Download of executable content 1 2150058370 50847 0
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058281 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058375 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058388 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058275 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058389 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058402 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058342 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058330 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058274 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058418 22 -10
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Table B.1: Prototype results (continued)
sig name sig priority ip dst tcp dport status
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058351 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058418 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058312 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058344 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058316 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058314 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058403 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058489 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058349 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058272 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058279 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058386 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058381 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058404 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058348 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058247 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058353 22 -10
OpenSSH sshd Identical Blocks DOS attempt 1 2150058349 22 -10
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2688863725 80 -120
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2688863725 80 -120
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2688863725 80 -120
EXPLOIT against Apache < 2.2.22 on Linux < 3.0 testrule 1 2688863725 80 -120
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2150058474 80 -200
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2150058474 80 -200
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2150058474 80 -200
EXPLOIT against IIS 7.5 testrule 1 2150058474 80 -200
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